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CHAPI'ER I 
INTRODUCTION 
John Bowd en Connally, Jr. c�me perilously close 
to becoming an afterthought in history because he was riding 
in the same car with President John F. Kennedy when he 
was· assassinated in Dallas 1n 1963. Howev�r, ·in a few 
short years he has grown in poli�ical ranks to become the 
personal advisor to President Richard Nixon for foreign 
and domestic affairs. For many of his fifty�six years, 
Mr. Connally has remained in the political limelight. 
· While advancing to a law degree at the University of Texas, 
in 1948, he was campaign manager for Lyndon B. Johnson, 
and continued · to serve in that capacity through 1964. He 
was appointed Secretary of the Navy and subsequently· served 
three terms as Governor of. Texas. He was vice-chairman to 
Lyndon B. Johnson and the Texas delegation to the Democratic 
.National Con·vention in 1956 and 1960. Also, he was chosen· 
to deliver nominating speeches for Mr. Johnson's bid for the 
Presidency in 1960 and 1964, and was liaison for Mr. Johnson 
. 
in pushing through the adoption of the pro-Vietnam War · 
platform plank in 19�8. 
Mr. Connally served on President Nixon's Advisory 
Council on Executive Organization and was appointed by 
1 
2 
the Presider.t as a member of the Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board befo�e finally accepting the appointment 
. . 
as �ecretary of Trea�ury i? 1971. c. w. Cook, chairman 
of General Foods Corporation, spoke for a host of Connally's 
Eastern fans when he-.said, "He'n intelligent, keen, tough, 
1 and very f orthr1ght--a very strong man," 
In the eightee� months John Connally served as 
head of the Treasury, he was 1nvol�ed 1n many changes- in 
the United States economic policy--both foreign and domestic. 
Mr. Nixon dubbed Co�nally "architect" of his new economic 
policy, appraised Connally's contribution as "No member 
of the Cabinet in an eighteen month period has contribu�ed 
more to this country t han ,has Secretary Connally.112 
This dynamic personality and abl_e ability has lent 
itself to speculation as to how far Mr. Connally will excel 
1n the pol1 ti cal world • .  .Apparently, his acceptability by 
leaders 1n both political parties and his success at economic 
policy-making has made him a man to watch. He clearly 
has a sense of his own importance. Aides once allowed him 
to be scheduled as the �econd speaker at some campaign 
d1n.ner long ago. "I �on• t speak second to apybody but 
ths President." Connally railed, "and you all better· get 
l"John.Conna1ly: Mr. Nixon's No. 2 Man?, " Newsw"ee!s, 
Auguet 7 .  1971, p, L0. 
p. JO. 
2"Corinally Au �evoir, " Newswe_qk, .May 29, 1972, 
3 
that goddam clear right now.� 3 rhis gives added mean1n� to 
the new lab�l applied to Connall y--the number two man in 
Washington. 
Puroose ar:d Significance of the .study 
The specific purpose of this '3tudy is to evaluate 
a speech given by ��r. Connally on May 28, 1971. This speech 
was one of many speeches .Connally gave to international 
monetary financiers dealing specifically with the new United 
Sta�es foreign monetary policy. The speech of May 28, 1971 
was singled out among the many for two specific reasons. 
First of all, it was the first time the foreign bankers 
had been told the United States Government was determined 
to defend the dollar and that other industrialized nations 
must respond by assuming greater world responsibility in 
trade arrangements. Second, this speech brought much 
international attention to Mr. Connally, and, therefore, 
Nixon allowed him more power in future economic policy 
making� 
This particular area of emphasis was sel ected for 
the t'ollo�ing reasons a 1) the I nternati
.
onal Monetary 
Policy has had a sign1ficant impact on current history, 
2) John B. Connally, Jr. is a unique ind1vidual whose rarid 
ri.se in politics ma'k.es his public speaking worth study, 
.3 .. John Connally's Other Careers, " Newsweek, December 28, 
1969. p. 14. 
4 
and 3) the author 4�stred to do a contemporar.v study .ar;rl 
had a personal interrst in Mr. Connally. 
The sigr.1�1.-�1:ce of the pB.ner can be �P.en �n t.�:--:t; 
areas: rhetorica1, 1.istorical, and personal. The s��r.j :"l-
cance of the thest s ro the rhetoric'\an will he as foll'JW':�: 
l) 1 t will provide a sr•.:dy of a coi:.teriporary �oeaker l n 
action, 2) it will �ake primary materi�l avajlable for 
further research abo�t Mr. Conna1ly, and J) lt will reveal 
some of the oersuasive techniques of �r. Connelly's rhetoric 
that have had a definite influence in shaping the financial 
policies of the United States of America. 
Historians �ay be benefited by 1) seeing a rhetorical-
historical analysis of the man and the policies he advocated, 
2) viewing how Connally has influenced the events of history, 
and 3) gaining perspective of contemporary events and 
conditions. 
This master's thesis is significant to the writer 
because 1 )  it provided an academic challenge in research 
and 2) it makes a rhetorical and historical contribution 
that may benefit others. 
Review of the Literature and Heloful Materials 
A review of t�e literature was necessary to be 
fully aware of what �s oresently known about the thesis 
topic. This is imperative to avoid duplication of re-
, 
search effort and to study similar types of scholarly 
research. 
5 
To be cogn
.
1.zant of previous studies, Dissertation 
Abstracts from 1960-1973 was surveyed without finding a 
single Ph. D. study relating to Mr. Connally's speaking. 
Also, Speech Mono�ra�hs were . examined for the same perio1 
of t ime. Other speech j ournals for the last eleven years 
were scanned· to see if any articles had been published 
about John Connally. These periodicals indicated that there 
was only one mast'er•s thesis written with emphasis on the 
rhetoric of John Connally, namely A Rhetorical Analysis 
of Selected Speeches of John Bowden Connally by. Robert D. 
Gratz, Bowling Green State University, January, 1964. A 
reading of this thesis revealed that Mr. Gratz was con­
cerned ·with Connally's earlier political career as governor 
of Texas. Therefore, his thesis provides interesting early 
background but has no direct bearing on the times and topic 
to be studied • . 
Because of the contemporary nature of the topic , 
magazine articles, personal contact with Connally's office, 
and newspapers were the major sources for research of . . 
Mr. Connally. Several magazine articles from major periodi­
cals were beneficial. Also, an examination of all the 
New York Times articles concerning Mr. Connally was quit� 
rewarding. 
As Connally l s  in the news almost daily, one of 
the challenges for this writer was·to keep abreast of the 
up..to-date happenings in his life. Mr. Connally' s offic� 
6 
in the Treasury Departme�t was hel pful 1 n  furni shing needed 
material , both bi ogrAphi Cal and rhetorical , S.ince they 
provided all the actual speech t exts and news releases 
available. 
There have been written theses which were helpful 
because they used a similar approach as the one suggested 
in thi s thesi s .  Two from Eastern Illinois University a!e 
Robert D. Rosebrough ' s  "Dr . Paul .Arthur Washburn' s  Speaking 
on the Union of the Evangeli cal United Brethren and Method i st 
. 
Churches•i and· Jeanne Jones' "A Rhetorical Analysis of 
Ambassador Adlai E .  Stevenson ' s United Nations Address of 
October 23, 1962, During the Cuban Missile Cri si s . �  
Organi zation of the Study 
This paper i s  divided into · five separate chapters .. 
Chapter I provides an introduction and also points out the 
purpose and significance of the stud y .  Further i t  reviews 
the literature, notes the material which proved to be most 
beneficial to this stud y ,  gives the criteria and method 
for rhetorical analysi s ,  and provides a brief summary of 
the crit eria i n  question form • 
. Chapter I I  presents a rhetorical biography of 
John B .  Connally , Jr . Attention 1 s  focused on hi s education, 
hi s speech training, h1 s political career , and hi s accomP-
11 shments as· Secreti;iry of Treasury for President Richard .:1. 
Nixon . 
7 
Chapter III discusses the progression of the United 
States• monetary policy from the �946 Bretton Wood agree­
ment to the speech g1ven 1n Munich, Germany in May of 1971. 
Chapter IV presents the analysis and the evaluation 
of the speech of May 28, 1971. The analysis and evaluation 
focus on the discovery of the type and quality of persuasion 
the speaker used in a specific situation to·affect a given 
audience. 
Chapter V. presents a summary and general conclusion 
which relates to the findings of this study • . 
Two appendices and a biography follow Chapter V. 
Appendix A contains a copy of the speech given by Mr. Connally 
to the International Bankers Conference of the American 
Bankers Association in Munich, Germany on May 28,. 1971. 
Appendix B. presents letters of inquiry and correspo�dence • . 
The bibliography which concludes this paper provides a 
listing of articles, books, and thesis which were used as 
references. 
The Criteria for the Rhetorical Analysis · 
In "The Study of Speeches" Wayland Maxfield Parrish 
contends that a rhetorical critic is concerned "not with 
the literal result of the speech, but with the speaker's 
use of correct method; not with the . �peech's effect, but 
8 
4 
wi tn_ 1ts effe�t1venr.qs.·· t'o accomol1sh th1s ana1ysjs of 
·•correct met hod" .rRr--.. 1 sh SUfl:P'e�ts the cr1 t� c keep i!"l m3 n·J 
Ari stotl e ' s def1nlt�0.� of rhetoric. "'I'he fn<'ulty of ob-
5 serving i n  any give!'� case the available meons of persuasjo-: . ·' 
Parri sh then proceeds to d en ne what t. c h1 m are the most 
important available ::nef.l�S by which a �pes.ker can persuade 
the li steners i n  a specific case. 
Thi s study wtll establish a s its hy pr)thesi s that 
John B. Connally was an effective speaker at �un1ch , Ger�any , 
May 2 8 ,  1971 . Thi s criteria will hel p in testing the valid i ty 
of the hypothesi s .  
To Parri sh ,  one of the most important elements of 
persuasion i s  t he speaker ' s  character and personal i ty .  
Questi ons , such as the following abstracted from Parri sh . 
6 
should be �sked by the criti c .  · 
I .  I s  there evidence in the speech that the speaker 
possessed persuas i ve personal qual1 t 1es--v1 rtue.  
intelligenc e ,  and good will? 
A .  Did he establ i sh hi s own authority with the 
audi ence? 
B. Did he have a sympatheti c  understanding of 
their way of l i f e ,  their thoughts ,  and thei r 
probl ems? 
c. Did he impress hi s aud i ence a s  being well-
1nformed on his  subject? 
4waylandM.Parrish , " The Study of Speeches , "  in 
S eeeh Cri ticisms i�ethods aiid Materi als. ed . by W i l l iam A. 
Lins ey u uque,  Iowa: Wm . c. Brown Company Publi shers, 
1968 ) , p .  85 . 
Eastern 
p. 10 . 
5rbid . 
6Jon Hopki ns, "Speech Cri t i c i sm 'Bibli ography , "  
Illinoi s Univ�rsi ty , Charl eston, Illinoi s ,  N . D . , 
(Mimeographed . )  
9 
D. Was he given to dogmatism, exaggeration, 
and overstatement? 
E .  Did he have a sense of humor? 
F, Was he sincere , friendly, fair-minded, 
modest, self-respecting, respectful; 
courteous, and tactful? 
By the way these qualities are �ccepted or rejected, the 
listeners mi�ht determine whether. they will acc�pt the rest 
of the speech. 
Other important factors 1n analyzirig a spee�h are in· 
its content. Parrish includes in content--strl.:1-cture of the 
speech, logic in the speech and order of arguments. The 
following qu�stions ,  abstracted from Parrish, should be 
asked. 
II. Did the speaker choose the right things to say? 
A .  Did he seem to b� acquainted ·with all the 
pertinent facts bearing on his subject? 
B. · Did he use those that were most significant 
and persuasive? 
1. Were these really facts or only guesses, 
opinion, hearsay? 
2. Did· he draw valid inferences from the 
evidence? 
J. Did he arrange the evidence and in­
ferences into a coherent logical 
structure that could satisfy the 
understanding and win conviction? 
III. What was the speaker's proposition or central 
thesis? . 
IV. What were th·e issues with which he dealt? 
v. What were the main supporting ideas? 
VI. Was the speech organized in general? 
A. Was the I ntroduction designed to win an 
intelligent, sympathetic, and attentive 
hearing? · 
B. Did the Discussion proceed step by step 
in �onformity with the need, the mood, 
and the e�pectation of the audience? 
. c. �id the Conclusion sum up what had .been 
said and make .a final appeal? 
� 
10 
'The third area of avallabie persuaslon mentioned 
by Parrish is denned as "perhaps the most important of 
all, "7 the appeal to certatn motives whicn should return 
an expected responi::�. The following questions, abstractetj, 
from Parrish, should be asked. 
VII. 
VIII. 
·ro whi�h "motives" did the speaker appeal? 
What. manners did he use to present the 
appeals? 
To Parrish, style, the choice and arrangement of 
words, determines whether or not. the speech will be of 
enduring literary value. Style is that one factor more 
than any other that makes � speaker unique. To determine 
style, the following questions, abstracted from Parrish, 
should be asked. 
IX. What was the nature and quality of the speaker's 
style? 
A. Was his style "immediately clear" to the 
audience? 
B. Were the vocabulary, allusions, illus­
trations, and sentence structures suited 
to the speaker, the audience, the occasion? 
1. Did he use concrete wording, effective 
descriptions, and flights of imagi­
nation? 
2. Was there conciseaess of statement, 
economy of style, and brevity of 
utterance? 
3. Was the style "spoken"· rather than 
"written"? 
c. Were there occasional passages of sus­
tained nobility and beauty? 
The only other available means of persuasion Parrish 
mentions is delivery. Of course, he is the first to mention 
that seldom will the text of a speech offer any hint as to 
7 Parrish, ·p. 88. 
11 
how the speech was spoken. One can only learn from reports 
made available to the critic. If any information is avan.able 
the cri tic should ask the,follow1ng question, abstracted 
from Parrish. 
X. What was the nature and quality of the spea�er•s . 
posture,  movement, gesture, ·pror:iounciati on , 
articula�lon, voice quality, and use (pitch. 
rate, force}.? 
One can see that these available means of persuasion 
are similar to classica1 canons of rhetoric with the ex-
cept1on of memory. But Parrish's criterta for rhetorical 
analysis should, if used correctly, answer the baste question: 
Has the speaker discovered ·and employed in this case the 
available means of persuasion? All quest·tons contained in 
the lists may not be applied, they will, h:>wever , be used 
1f they pertain to the speech. 
Chapter I has provided an introduction to the 
study. I t  includes these following divisions1 (1) purpose 
and significance of the study, (2) review of the literature 
and helpful materials, ( 3) organization of the study, (4) 
criteria for rhetorical analysis, �nd (5) conclusion. 
The second chapter gives an in-depth rhetorical 
biography of the speake� and will aid the reader in giving 
a greater understanding for the complete study of this 
paper. 
CHAPrER II 
THE SPEAKER 
On February 2'7, 1917, one of John Bowden and Lela 
Wright Connal ly ' s  seven children was born· on a tenant farm 
near Floresville; Texas . 1 He was named John Bowden 
Connally, Jr . after hi s father. When John' s  parents married 
in 1908 they had no money , no home ,  and no f�rniture. 2 
·During John ' s  early l i fe hi s father had to work hard at 
what jobs he could geti tenant far�er , butcher, shop keeper , 
bus dri Ver. He. came from g poo.r family made poorer by the 
�epression.J Connally liked to tell his campaign audiences . . . 
that during hi s young l i f e  he had to· study by kerosene 
iight . 4 
C onnally ' s  formal education was receiyed from both 
Floresville and ·Harland�le [San Antonio] . At di fferent 
stages in his li fe he wanted to be a cowboy,  a preacher, 
a Texas Ranger, a Canadian Mountie ,  a Lawyer. I n  1932 ,  
l" Folksy Texas Poli tician," New York Time-s , June·4, 
1966., p .  19. 
· 
2Ronni e Dup;ger , "John Connally: Nixon• s New �uarter­
back, .. A tlant i c ,  July . 1971, p.  84. 
3A .  Kopkinds, " Connally ' s  Texas," New Republ i c ,  
November 20, 1965, p. 9. · 
4" Clos� to the Land ," Time, January 17, 1964, p .  20. 
1 2  
13 
because of a successful bus route hi s father ran , th� family 
was able to. purchase a 1 , 000-acre farm . The income from 
t hi s  made 1t possi bl e to _cover John's tu1t'lon when he w.qs 
ready . to  enter colle�e . 5 
John chose to att end the Uni versity of Texas . H i s  
pol itical career, hi s leadership traits ,  ar.d his speaking 
skills blossomed for the first time while he atten1ed the 
university.  He became student body presi d ent , which paid 
him 130 a month . 6 Dr , Wayne N. Thompson , professor of 
Speech at the University of Texas di sccve�ed , in  researching 
Connally' s bac�ground , that "Mr . Connally was very active 
i n  student pol i t i cs and often
.
addressed rallies , 11 7 
Dr . Thompson also found that C onnally_ held many 
offi ces of various speech organi zations as_ well as winning 
recognition i n  an extracurricular speech contest . 
• • • He was winner of the Inter-Society Oratorical 
Contest, President of the Ath�aneum Lit erary Society , 
president of the dramati c  society Alpha Psi Omega, 
member �f the legal fraternity Delta Theata Phi, 
vice president and speaker of the freshman law 
class , chairman of the Stud.ent A ssembly,  and presi-
4ent of the Studepts A ssociation ,  • , • [The 
Atheaneum Soci ety] was much like the other literary 
soc i et i es of the thirties and the still earli er 
times.  It sponsored speech contest s ,  including· 
formal debates , and was in a sense a program in· 
5ougger, p ,  84, 
6; , Close t o  the Land , "  p .  20 . 
7Robert D, Gratz , "A Rhetoric�l Analysi s of S elected 
Speeches of John Bowden Connally , "  (u.r:ipubl 1 shed M . A .  Thesis, 
Bowling Green State University ) ,  p .  17J. 
14 
1ntramur�l forensics, In Atheaneum the speakers. 
were ragged or harrassed, 
Mr, Connally was on the debate squad, b1t there 
is no record that. he engaged 1n any in'tercolleglate 
event,8 · 
At the university Connally took two speech classesa Be-
ginning Interpretat10n, a freshman course, and a sophomore 
course in interpretive reading,9 
While still at the university, Connally attended 
a play rehearsal and met an attractive young· beauty queen 
(Un1vers1ty of Texas Sweetheart, Cactus 3eauty and Relay 
Queen) playing .a belly dancer, Idanell (Nellie) Brill.IO 
. . 
They were married in 1940, They have two sons and a daughter: 
a second daughter, Kathleen died in 1959 at the age of six-
. 11 teen--an apparent suicide, 
In 1936 John Connally first became acquainted with 
Lyndon B. Johnson,. the man who would become his constant 
political companion and friend for over a decade, Apparently, 
Johnson got Connally his job stacking books in the library 
on campus for 17¢ an hou.r. I� was part of the National 
12 Youth Administration Project. The next year Connally 
8Ibid, 
91bid,. p, 172. 
lO"John Connally: Mr. Nixon•s No. 2 Man? , " Newswee�. 
August 9, 1971, p. 19. 
11"Close·to the Land," p, 16. 
12Majo-r1e Hunter, "t-;emories of �he Depression Spur 
Johnson•s Fight to Eradicate Poverty, "'New York Times, 
December 1, 1964, p. 18, 
15 
13 
played a .minor role in Johnson• s successful bid for Congress • 
.After receiving his LL.R.; he was r�warded for his h'3lp by 
being taken to Washington by Johnson in 19J9. He stayed 
. " 
till 1941, when he enlisted in the Naval Reserve as an 
ensign, 14 
Although Connally does not discuss his mili t·ary 
career publicly ,  he served his cou11try well during World 
War II, in non-c�mbatant assigr..men ts as well as both the 
Atlantic and Pacific Theatres aboard the aircraft carr1ers 
Essex and Bennington. He won both the Bronze Star and the 
Legion of Merit. One of the awards cited "his professional 
skill, brillant tactics, and cool courage in the face of 
grave· peril. "l5 Be left the service as a Lieutenant · Com­
mander in January of 1946. 
When Connally came home after the war he worked 
in the Johnson's radio st�t1on, KTBC, in .Aust1Zf for awh1_le. 
He eventually borrowed $25, 000 to start radio station KVET. 
He was president, general manager, and attorney for the 
station for �hree years from 1946-49 . 16 Connally took time. 
13110� to the Alamo,-" Time, December 22, 1961, p. 11 • 
. 
1411New Texan on the Potomac," Time, December 2a: 
1970 f p. 9. 
15stan Hall, "Connally, a man who likes the Action, " 
Chicago Sun Times, August 29, 19?1, p. 8. 
16Dugger, p. 85. 
16 
to become chi ef strategi st for Lyndon B .  Johnson' s 1948 
Senate race .  Connally says,  "I really ran the ·campaign 
t hat year . 11 1 7  
A pparently Connally was almost run . for offi ce in-
stead of LBJ because Johnson could not decide if he wanted 
to run. Newsman Stua�t Long reports,  
We sat and talked , eight of  us • •  , • Finally we 
agreed that John Connally should run . Be would . 
have been a good campaigner . He was big and hand­
some with three brothers who were even bigger and. 
more handsome ,  and their father looked like Old 
Man Texas himsel f .  They would all have campaigned 
for Connall y  • • .  Next morning , some of us advised 
Johnson of our deci sion, and asked hi s suppor t .  H e  
was popping mad o f  course and that afternoon he 
announced as a candidate . 1 8  
That was �he race that seemed to stir · u p  a great 
many inquiri e s .  I t  i s  reported that after the pol�s . closed , 
203 vot!!s were added to the returns from .Alice,  Texas and 
Johnson won by 87 votes out of a million cast . 19 Connally 
again was rewarded. and became Johnson' s  administrative 
assi st.ant for awhile in Washington in 1949 ,  but .decided 
to resign to join the Austi.n firm of Powell,  Wirt z ,  and 
Rahaut . 20 
l 7Ibid . 
1 8aobert Sherr1 ll, " The Hise of John Connally , "  
The Nation,  Augus� 7, 1972, p .  6 8 .  
l9"The R i si ng Star From Texas , " Time , October 1 8 ,  
19 71 , ·P • 2 4 • 
. 
20B1ographical enclosure in letter
.
from Secretary 
Connally' s offi ce ,  October 1 2 ,  1971, p. 2 .  · 
17 
rn·1952, perhaps because of his close relati�nsh1p 
with Lyndon B. Johns0n, he became attorney for the vast 
operations ·of oil bill\onaires Sid Richardson and Perry R. 
Bass of Fort Worth. The ·ass6c1at1on with Mr. Richardson 
was to. lead to not only great power in high places but also 
to great wealth. As C�nnally explained about their wage 
agreement, "At · the end of our talk he told mes 'I'll pay 
you enough so Nellie and the kids won't go hungry. • "21 
Mr. Richardson was active in management of broad-
casting. 'real estate, ret�il sales, oil, gas, ra.nching, 
manufacturing, and investment interests. Connally hel.ped 
operate this· empire and later became trustee of the Rictardson 
Foundation a·nd administrator of hi� estate.. .All these 
associations have brought Connally great wealth and exten­
s1 ve knowledge of the oil industry. 22 
One of Connally's jobs was to lobby (although he 
never registered as a lobbyist) against any Government 
effort to deplete tax deduction on income on oil and gas 
producers. In 1956, Connally was one of the powerful 
lobbyists who tried to free natural gas from federal price 
controls. The bi 11 was passed w1 th the st'rong help of . 
House Speake·r Sam Rayburn and Lyndon �. Johnson. Eisenhower 
vetoed the bill shortly after because South .Dakota Republ�can 
21 Dugger, p. 85. 
22"John ConnGlly's Other Care�rs, " Newsweek,  
December 28, 1970, p, 14. 
18 
Senator Francis Case said he.was offered R $2, 500 bri be to 
suppo�.t the bill . Columnist Drew Pearson said. " Connall'y 
was one of the most 'brazen lobbyi st.s 1 n Washington for tr.a 
natural gas bill .'' 23 
Connally ws� campaign mana�er for Lyndon B.  Johnson 
three times . H.e ·placed Johnson• s name in nomination for 
his unsuccessful attempts 1 n  1956 and 1960 , and 1964 which 
was successful. 
During the push for the Presidency in 1960 , it 
seemed Johnson was losing the nomination to John F. Kennedy .  
. . 
Connally ·held a .Press conference explaining Kennedy was 
suffering. from Addison• s disease , and was being· kept. al1 ve . . 
only by massive doses of. cortisone and should not get the 
bid for the presidency. He also theorized on Joseph Kennedy's 
·24 alleged pro-Nazi views during the 19JO ' s .  
In spite of Connally's blatant attempt to sabota�e 
Kennedy as a favor to Johnson, the new President Kenn�dy 
named Connally Secretary of the Navy in 1961 • . The Kennedy 
Administration at the time was trying · to shift m�re power 
to the Secretary of Defense po·si ti on·, held by Robert S .  
McNamara and underwrite the power of the service positions. 
Although Connally was the most successful of the three 
23nugger, µ. 8,). 
24 .. on 
.
to tr1'� A lamo , "  p. 11. 
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service secretaries at acqulring what was needed for·the 
. . 2 5  Navy, h e  decided to return to Texas. 
However, �hlle in office, Connally approached his 
duties trying to communicate with as many people under his 
command as possible. 
He rented the biggest auditorium in Washington-� 
Constitution Hall--and called in every Navy and 
Marine officer in the Capital area. Some 4,000 
came in to hear Connally outline his plans--as 
.well as his hopes for the department during more 
than an hour, , • •  The speech was recorded and 
played back to whole units of ·the fleet and to 
all admirals who servai outside Washington, sent· 
with personal covering letters f·rom the Secretary. 
Mimeographed copies went to every other commanding 
office • • • •  26 
· 
During his travels as Secretary, he had time to 
·reflect about the needs of his home state. 
I saw Adenauer in Germany. I .saw emergence. of 
the Common Market. I saw the vitality in Italy. 
At the Pentagon I saw what educ·ation meant, how 
basic it was, and how lacking Texas was·. I 
looked at Texas, and .I saw we were going to miss 
the boat completely,27 
So in a letter of resignation, effective n·eqember 20, 1961, 
. . 
Connally said he was going·home, "offering whatever energies, 
experience and abilities I h�ve to the people of Texas.028 
. . 
He returned with Kennedy's· blessing and Johnson's political 
25 . Frank v. Fowlkes, "Connally revitalizes Treasury, 
assumes Stewardship of Nixon's new .Economic Policy , "  �ational 
Journal, October 2 ,  1971, p. 1997. 
26Gratz, p, 25. 
27 ... close to the Land, " p. 20. 
-� 
280connally Resigns .Navy Secretary, " New York Til!les. 
December · 12, 196�� p, 1. 
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push, although at the time Connally tells that LBJ was not 
in favor of the ruove � "I remember him saying bluntly. •'Why 
I think you're crazy to give up a Cabinet post. 11•29 . 
When he returned, the Texas people �id not greet 
him with their support. A 1961 poll showed that onl·y one 
per cent of Texas voters. would baclc Connally in the next 
year's election.30 He had quite a battle ahead of him. 
Not only did he have to defeat the Republican party in 
Texas, but he also had to fight a strong liberal Democrat, 
· Don Yarborough, who was supported by President Kennedy. 
From time to time he did, however, play up his former 
position in the Kennedy Administration, especially when 
appealing to Negro and Latin American groups.31 Otherwise 
he appeared conservative. 
The 'tattle was a hard fought one. Connally refused 
to debate Yarborough on television, but instead chose to 
attack him in subtle ways in speeches he gave to groups. 
. . 
At almost every meeting, Connally would t�ll the voters that· 
Yarborough was the candidate of the Americans for Democratic 
Action. In Texas that was like equating him with the Communist 
. 29John Connally, "Why Kennedy Went to Texas," Life, 
November 24, 1967, p. 86B. 
: 3oR
·
. Sherrill, "Politics on the King's Ranch, " New 
York Times Magazine, June 5, 1966, p. �06� 
Jl .. connally Victor in Texas Hur,-off," New York Times, 
June 3, 1962, p. 66. 
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party. 32 This was his way of attacking the liberals. 
"Connally as. Governor would know how to destroy us, " one 
of them s.aid in the 0ampaign. "He wollld set 11 berali sm 
back ten years in Texas. " 33 Connally �as nominated by 111 s 
party by a margin of 27,000 votes out ·of more than a mill1on 
cast. 34 
As luck would have it, the· Cuban missile crisis 
arose after the primary. Connally seemed to use this as 
a definite advantage against the Republican candidates, 
He accused the Texas Republican leadership of trying to 
destroy national unity by "a bitter, unprincipled attaclc 
on the President and Vice President of the United States . .. 35 
The issues of the whole campaign seemed.to be largely 
personalities, not the state problems. One critic said. 
Connally was playing "the same damned no-party, no-issue 
. 36 politics Lyndon has always played. " Elections based on 
personalities are hard fought,. but Connally came through 
victorious. 
. I 
John B. Connally Jr. was·sworn into the office as 
the )8th governor of Texas on January 15, 1963. 37 Whether 
32"Not so Simple , "  Time, June 8, 1962, p. 25. 
33 .. Folksy Texas Politician, " p. 19. 
34sherr1ll, "Poli tics on Ranch, " p. 106. 
35 .. Cuba Crisis May Blunt Hard. GOP Drive in Texas, " 
New York Times, October 28, 1962, p. 5,6 • 
. 36"Texa
.
s .�ebels, " tJew Republic, May 21, 1962, p. 5. 
37Gratz, p. 27. 
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or not Connally would have gone down in ·re:xas hist ory as 
a great governor was taken out of hi s hands when John F .  
Kennedy was assassinate� and John Connally was seriously 
wounded during a motC'rcade tour of Dallas on No V'ember 22 , 
1963. President Ken�edy had wanted to come to Texas for 
two reasons1 to raise money and to improve his posit1or; i n  
the state for the 1964 election . 38 Connally had asked 
Kennedy to speak only to Texas businessmen , but Kennedy's. 
. . 
advance men demanded more exposure to the crowd . "A fter 
. 39 a ' heated argument' the Kennedy people won out ." 
The assassination brought about two changes in 
Connally .. First he became almost a demigod symbol to the 
voters in Texas whi ch would assure him an overwhelming 
. 4 victory i n  1964. O And also John Connally ' s philosophy 
t oward l i fe was altered . He felt he had been saved for a 
specif i c  reason. " Now I feel that , rather than being 
elected , maybe I ' m  one of God ' s  elect . The good Lord chose 
. 
41 to l eave me here,  so I figure I ' m  one of God ' s  elect . "  
At t hi s  time Texas . Attorney General Crawford Martin said 
42 " He ' s  more religious than he puts on . "  
38 C onnally, p. 86A . 
J9" Back t� Dallas , ' '.  Time , N0vember 24, 1967,  p ,  55. 
40Kopkind s. ·iJ ·• 1 O; 
41Dugger , p. � 8 .  
42r bi d .  
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The most significant event of his first ter� in 
office would be the assassination. The highlight of his 
second term would be ht s campa.ign against the Qreat Soctety. 
In 1964; he was re-elected by more than �ne million votes 
43 
in the primary elections. While he was running for office, 
he took time out from his campaign to nominate Lyndor. Johnson 
for President in i9·64 at the Democratic National Convention. 
This· support was shortlived. 
Connally administered the Texas programs of the 
· Great Society with little enthµsias�. In fact, he was 
asked to leave the Democratic party by the Texas AFL-CIO 
if he was not going to ·support the national platform. "It 
is further recommended that he seek a political party more 
in line with his own views and political. posit.ions. "
44
. 
Gover�or Connally supported 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act 
which permits states to have so-called right-to-work laws. 
Both President Johnson:and the AFL-CIO wanted the law re-
pealed. Albert Fay, a Republican from Houston, said he 
wanted. "to . publicly commend him [Connally] and invite him 
4 . into the Republican party." -5 
Also he spoke out for state vetoes on an.ti-poverty 
programs, publicly went on television to oppose the civil 
43 Letter, p. 2. 
44"Texas Labor Scores Connally Position, " New York 
Times, August 7, 1965, p. 49. 
451bid. 
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rights laws guaranteeing all c1 tizens access· to publ.ic 
46 accommendations, and other Great Society legislation. 
The Texas liberals felt sure these political differenc�s 
would cause a split between Johnson and Connally. But, ·as 
The New Republic said, "They agree to di ::;agree . .. 47 After 
all, Connally was concerned with his state's rights--Johns0n 
was legislating for aJl of the United States. 
This conflict appeared again in the spring of 1966. 
The Justice Department sent F.B. I. agents to. Texas to watch 
over a special voter registration period that followed the 
abolition of Texas poll tax. Connally accused ' the Adminis-
trat1on of "either frivolous harrassment or an attempt to 
48 
take over the authority of the state government. " Even 
through all this criticism , Connally did not attack the 
President as much as he . blamed "bad ad.vice from the Eastern 
Establishment. "  
49
. 
Since they were still close ·friends, Connally' s 
reactions during this period were at times very critical 
and at times very ki�d. At an unscheduled press conference, 
he condemned the President for "coming down here and agreeing 
with me, and then going up there and doing the opposite.-"50 
46Kopkinds, p. 11. 
47 Ibid,, p. 12. 
4811comradely combat, President Johnson's finest 
Friend, " Time, April 15 , 1966, p. 25. 
49Ib1d. 
·. \ 50sherr111 , "Politics on Ranch , "  p. 105. 
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But a few days bef0re the Texas primary in 1966, the. Goverrinr 
introduced the FrP.sldF!:'lt as "the most ded1cated, able, 
compassionate Prec.i'Jent of this century .. " 1ind Johnson. 
with tears in his e� .. :>s responded w'tth ' my John . • •  my 
Joh�." 51 
Even though Connally did 4ot agree·with a lot of 
LBJ's d9mestic policies he did endorse Johnson's tough 
foreign policy, especially in Vietnam. In the summer of 
19�6 at the Democratic Governor's Ccnventipn, Governor 
Connally gave the major speech in opposition to Governor 
Hatfield, in support of the President's foreign policy. 
"We are trying to say to Hanoi and· Peking that they [south 
. . 
Vietnam] are not going to have. peace on dishonorable terms: 
We are going to honor our commitment S·, right or wrong, 
52 wherever they may be." ae neyer swerved from this stand. 
Connally was not considered the friend of the Blacks 
nor the Latin Americans during his governorship (1963-68). 
Although he was the first·Governor to hire members of 
minorities for �ighway Patrol jobs an� naming several to 
.
state boar�s. 53 he snubbed a group of Latin .Americans in 
1966 �ho walked 350 miles to �sk him to su pport a state: 
minimum wage.54 ThE? chicano of the 5tate S�nate, 
5l Ibid • , p. ., o J .. 
52oavid Brori r�r, "Governors Back V1 et Nam Policy,'' 
New York Times, July 8, 1966, p. 13. 
5".3sher�1-11, "Politics on rtanch," p. 105, 
\ 
54nugger, p, 89. 
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Joe Bernel, said, " I ' ll always remember him as an lmroaculat�ly 
dressed, handsome, Texas-type son of a bitch,055 This k�nd 
of description 1s not unique from Connally's enemies. 
In the 1�66 election campaign GonnallY got a chs�ce 
to e'xpla1n his reActi on to rough-and-tumble poll tics. 
I n  a sense 1t is a dirty business, but nqt corrupt. 
It's mean • • •  It's tough • . .  [ Peo ple J wjll say 
some mean things about you, but thi s  1 s  one of the 
burdens you have to bear. �eople s � y ffiean things 
about me--and they will this year. 56 
Connally never held back any opinions he had, He 
is aware that some people do not agree with him. 
I have always felt 1t ls my duty to speak out on 
· an issue, even if a majority of the people may 
disagree with me on a particular point. The 
people expect this even when they disagree, and 
I have found that a public official is usually 
judged by his total program and contributions 
rather than a few controversial 1ssu.es. 5 7 
And speak out he did, Connally averaged over 100 reports 
to the Texas voters every year he was in office, meeting 
the challenges head on, 58 
Several of his close friends admit Connally was 
bored by the dally routine of the executive life, but he 
seemed to enjoy challeng�s. 59 He prided himself on controlling 
55Ibid ---- · · 
56sherrill, "Politics on Ranch," p. 105 . 
57Gratz, p, 176. 
581b1d., p. 177. 
59 .. Rising Star from Texas, " p� 24. 
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his one party st.a t P.  and keeping it intact. He has said, 
"Texas 1 s a one- part.y state, and I ' ll see t� 1 t that 1 t 
Stays that Way. " 60 �- k t tl l t i .1e new cons a n  y w 1a was go ng on 
in the state. He c ... :.r�trolled the men who c ontrolled the 
politics in . Texa s--Rll co�servetive, althou�h he sees t�e 
situation differently. " I ' m  not an aro t�ister at all. I 
would like to thir.k that I'm an advocate, or a spokesm � n .  
I'd like to think I ' �  not forcing people t o  d o  what they 
don• t want to . do because I don't t r�nk you can do that 
61 anyway. " 
Whether or not he · felt he could force issues , he 
was politically powerful. In the last Congressional session 
. . 
in 1966 the Governor rammed through a new Congressional 
redistricting bill, a legislative bill an� . a 'bill "to create 
a highly cont�oversial "super-board"--a coordinating Board 
of Regents for both the Texas. A & M and University of Texas 
systems, which critics content gave. him virtually dictatorial 
62 
powers over curricula and faculties. 
By the spring of 1967, Connally developed a m1lq_ 
case of stomach ulcers. In the fall of that year, a year 
before the n�xt gubernatorial election, Connally anno�nced 
he would not run for the fourth term. In announcing, he 
explained his reason s. · 
60 8 Dugger, p. 8 • 
61 0 John Conna lly; ' No .  2, " p .  20. 
62sherr111',. " Polit�cs on Ranch, " p. 106.  
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I have reluctantly concluded t.,hat after the stra.in 
of what will have been eight years of vigorous 
public service. I no longer can be assured 1 n  my 
own heart that I could .bring to the office for 
another two year8 the . enthusiasm, the resil1 ence, 
the patience that my con�cience would .demand, and 
the state wo� l d  i eserve . b J 
He did this knowing h·e would have won P-a�ily if he wouJ J 
have wanted to run for a fourth t�rm. 
His accomplishments as Governor of Texas for slx 
years appear quite modest. Some ne� indu�tiy was att!act ed 
to the state, a tourist developrr..ent agency was set up, a 
commission appointed to study h1gher education· problems. 
Texaa minorities have spoken cut violently against his 
. . 
stand opposing the public accommodations section of Presi-
dent Johnson's civil right·s bill. And in his own party, 
the liberal Democrats were very angry because Connally had 
64 frequently snubbed them. 
The one area· he seemed to excel i n  was the growth 
of· better education in Texas . Connally said he wanted to 
be known as "the educa�ion Gove�nor , " 65 and he will be, 
because spending for higner education rose 150 percent 
and for secondary education 100 percent. The expenditures 
66 for mental-health rose JOO percent. 
6J . connally bars Hace in Texas for Forth Term as 
Governor, " New York Times, Nove�ber 11 , 1967, p. 18. 
64" Scars and a Mamory, " Time, December 6, 1963, 
p. 27A. 
65sherrill •. " Politics on Ranch, " p. 103. 
66 . .  connall'Y Kennedy Shifts I t •  s M�aning, " U . S. � 
and World Report, December 28, 1.970. p. 11. 
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Along wit h the increase in education was th� increase 
of �axes during C onnally ' s term as G ovetnor . · The Texas 
budget rose from $1 . J  bi llion to j2 . 5 . b1lli on a year, a lmost 
doubling.6 7 Connally ·a�gued that thi s was not as bad a s  
it seems. That increa ses . i n se�v l ce to �exas outweigh�d the 
tax rise , and that, pe� capita,  taxes rose only 16.4  percent 
68 while the national average rose by 21. 8 percent . 
Even though the taxes rose, the business taxes did 
not rise nearly �s much as·  per capita income of the people 
and Connally was not shy about mentioni ng thi s to big busi-
ness. The New York Times tells that Connally admitted 
( at a meeting in San Antonio in 1966 that was supposed. to 
have been secret ) , that his admini stration had gone out of 
its �ay to. k eep taxes off busi ness, although " every poll 
shows business taxes are the most popular with the publi c. " 69 
All of these i ssues have caused him to �ain great 
admiration from some and extreme hatred from others. 
Yarborough� Connally' s  long time enemy, cal ls Connally 
. 
70 "the worst , the most reacttonary Governor i n  Texas hi story , "  . 
While State Senator Babe Schwartz sees Connally,  with whom 
he usually disagrees. as " a  very able ,  intelligent, capable 
71 . Governor." 
67Ib1d. 
69she!r111, 
70r b1d. 
681 bid. 
"Poli tics on Ranch, " p. 104 • 
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Before leaving the governor' s office, Connally did 
one last favor for LBJ . That was to go to the 1968 Demo-
cratic National Conve:-it 1 on in Chic�go and help push throu�h 
th� adoption of the pro-Vietnam War platform plank. This 
was done·, but not without causing a split i n . the· Democrat1 c 
Party .  
John Connally had always supported the war in Vi etnam. 
In 1965 , he and nine other governor� went to Vietnam to visit 
. 72 the American troops and give tr.em moral support. He urged 
the participants of the National Goverr.ors Conference in 
1966 to back the Vietnam War. When asked why the Goverr.ors 
• • t \ 
should take a stand on i nternational policies ,  Governor 
Connally explained i t  wa� because " the di-ssension 1 n  the 
halls of Congress does not reflect �he . feelings of the 
/ 
American people . "  He argued, "Governors are more attuned 
to the day-to-day thinking of the people in their·  state 
73 than any member ·of  Congress." Thi s confli"ct between 
Senators and Governor Connally arose again in 1968. 
The l iberals at the Democratic National Convention, 
esp�c1ally Senator Eugene McCarthy and Senator George 
.McGovern , were atta�ked verbally · by Connally. He accused 
McCarthy and McGovern of advocating poli cies of " appeasement 
72" 10 Gove:!'r:ors ·Plan Visit to  Vietnam in October , "· 
New York Times , Augu st 3 ,  1965 , p. 2. 
7Joa:.,id Bron er. "Governor Bac�s Vietnam Polic y . "  
New York Times, July R ,  1966 , p :  J 3 . 
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74 and surrender" iri V1 etnam. .Pierre Salinger took the 
defensive on this and accused Connally of resorting to 
"old-type Joe t'i cCarthyi sm . " 75 
In Connally's . platform he called for the Democr� t i c  
part y to make it cry�tal clear to Communist aggressors 
" t hat we will not sit  idly by while they s�ackle nations 
after nations and deny � he weaker nati ons and weaker peoples 
76 the right to self determination. " Of course this too was 
opposed by liberal party members. Eugene H • . Nickerson, a 
Nassau county executive , called 1 t " blood th1 rsty . "  And 
he felt t�t Connally was ca�lin'g t i  for bigger a!'ld better 
w�r s . 11 77 The di ssenting voice did not win out, however � 
and President Johnson � s  platform, through John Connally, 
remained intact . 
When Connally left the governor' s  mansion, the 
Houston law firm of V1.nson, Elki ns,  and Searls added Connally 
to its  name.  Estimates of his salary ran around $800,000 
a year. This i s  just added to his worth as a millionaire. 
· He owns Tortuga Ranch in the Southwest part of Texas of 
an estimated value of $300 ,000 , and his hc�e i s  located 
74" Statement by Governor John B. Connally Jr.  e r · 
Texas before the Democratic platform committee, " New York 
Times , August 2 J, 19 68 ,  p. 2 J. 
75"Saling·er Denounces Speech by C.:onnally, ti New 
York Times, August ?. � ,  1968, p. 18 . 
76 .. statement before Democratic Committ�e," p .  2 3  . 
. 
77° sal1nger Denounces Speech, " p .  1 8 .  
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on a l�, 000 acre ranch near Floresville. 78 When he �as 
governor he moved 1 r.to the five bedroom, six bath home ,  
complete with swimmt r.� pool and land i ng stri p.  When asked 
how much i t  cost h e  c :ily ·remarked " too much. " 79 Thi s l s  
where he does hi s most important entertaining of d1gnltar1 �s . 
President Nixon bei 11s; one •. 
Connally vj s1 ted Washington in. 1969 and expressed 
to the Whi te House how he had not really supported Hubert 
· Humphrey in Texas for President and how he helped Nixon 
"all he could. 11 80 In the book The Resurrection of Richa!£ 
Nixon, the author maintains that Connally " • • •  actually 
worked secretly through most of the campaign to rai se money 
for Nixon while puclicly ignoring HHH. " 81 Then right before 
the election, he decided not to support· Nixon because i t  
looked a s  though Humphrey might ·carry Texas . Nixon., in 
grateful response , appointed Connally to the Advi sory Counci l  
on Execut1.ve Organization headed by industrialist Roy Ash.  82 
He was later, in December of 1970 ,  appointed to the Foreign 
·�ntell1gence .Advi sory Board. Thi1s group 1 s responsible for 
78"R1 s1ng Star, 11 p .  24. 
79" People of the Week , "  U .  s ,  News and World Report , 
April 1 2 ,  1964 ,  p .  -20 . 
SOR .  J .  Whalen ,  " Nixon-Connally Arrangement , "  
Harper , Augus� 1971, p .  )8, 
8l"�atter of Sides , 11 Time, July 27, _ 1970 ,  p ,  14. 
82whalen, p .  J8 . 
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advi sing the President on the " overall national 1nte�l1gence 
effort and for recommendi ng to him appropriate measures to 
increase the effect i veness of the United State$ intelligence 
commun1ty . " 83 
I t  was at the final meeting of the A sh commi tt�e 
that Connally caught the eyes and ears· o f  the President. 
"Connally dominated the meeting . · He explained i n  a very 
articulate, confidant , and forceful way the reasoning behind 
the recommendati ons. That meeting lasted more than t hree 
hours ,  and Nixon came away very impressed . .. 84 Connally ' s  
report led to the new Council on Internati onal �conomic 
Policy to devi se ways of promoting United States interests 
in an era of increasing world-trade competi t i on from lower­
cost producers i n  Japan ·and the European communi ty. 85 
To help balance the cabinet with a Democrat, Nixon 
had offered Connally a cabinet post ·i n  1968, when he was 
choosing his men around him, but Connally turned him down. 86 
The reason for the acceptance a year later l s  not completely 
clear except through Connally ' s explanation. He said the · 
83"Governor Connally Named Member, Foreign Intel­
ligence Advi sor, " Department of State Bulletin ,  January .18 , 
1971 , p. 84. 
84whalen, p. 38. 
85"John Con�a1iy1 No� 2, "  p. 16. 
86., Presid.er1t · :nxon takes a Democrat , "  Time , December 28, 
1970 . p. 8. . 
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President " convinced me after many hours of conversa tion 
that I could contribute something to hi s Admini stration and . 
thu s .  t o  the welfare of thi s country and the .stabi l i ty of 
8 7  the country. A nd" I suppose I was vain enough t o  try i t , "  
Connally ' s  qual i ti e s  that seemed beneficial to Pr esi-
d ent Nixon are numerou s .  The bi partisan approach t o  major 
programs i n  Congress was needed by Nixon , and C onnal l y , .  as 
a Democrat , could hel p .  The fact that Nixon needed to carry 
Texas i n  the 1972 Presidential campaign was . influential . But 
most importantl y ,  Ni.xon needed a dynam i c  worker for his 
economic pol i c i e s .  
A t  a news bri efing Nixon listed h i s  reasons& 
One, . because of the confidence .that I have developed 
i n  his judgment and hi s abili ty and devot ion to thi s 
country i n  these past 18 months working with him on 
the Ash C ounci l i  two , because h i s  experience a s  
Governor o f  Texas for three terms--one of the major 
states--gives him special qual i f i cati ons in the 
fi eld of revenue� shari ng ,  an area in whi c h  we are 
t o  have some new programs i n  our new budget • • •  and , 
three, because G overnor C onnally i n  the fi eld o f  
finance ,  whi l e  h e  i s  not a banker, has a great · deal 
of experi ence. 88 
· 
Some officials say all these reasons are true but Nixon was 
compl etely won over by Connall y .  "The ?resident doesn' t 
just adm ire · Connally . He stands i n  awe of hi m . 11 89 
87" A s  Connally Sees His Cabinet Job, " U . s .  News and 
World R eport , February 15, 1971 , p .  J 6 .  
88"Th1 s A ppo1 ntment S i gni fl es Something Fundamental , " 
u . s .  News and W orld R eport , December 14, 1 9 70 ; p .  1 0 .  
8911John Connallya No . 2 , "  p . 1 1 7 .  
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The reaction to the appointment ran from Wilbur 
Mills, chairman of the House Ways and M eans Committee and 
the single most important power in Wa:.>hingt o.n in econom1 � 
· matters , saying, " I  think it  is a good appointment," 90 
to �:assachusetts Goverr.or Francis Sargent, " Can he add� 11 91 
Former Presldont Johnson's reaction was two ·prcnged. 
Connally did· not tell Johnson of his decision till after it  
was made. R i c hard J.  Whalen, a former advisor and speech 
writer of Nixon revealed, in a Harner arti cle, that Nixon 
put through � seemingly innocent call to the LBJ ranch and 
after a casual talk expressed a desire " to introduce his 
92 new Secretary of the Treasury-- ' an . old fri end of yours.'" 
or course Johnson was taken back. Quite a f.ew months later 
Connally d i scloseds "Johnson was mi ffed, and I don ' t  really 
blame him . "  9 J 
There was a slight delay . i n  getting his appointment 
confirmed because. of moneys he received while governor of 
Texas .  The New York Times revealed that while serving as 
Governor of Texas for six years he rece1ved, · all i n  all . 
about $575, 000 from the Richardson Foundation for fi fteen 
months work in helping as one of the three co-executors ·ror 
90 
. 
"New. Texan on the Potomac, 11 p. 10 . 
91 ., John Con rial l y :  No . 2, "  p .  1 7 .  
92rbid. , r .  1 8 .  
93rbid. 
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the estate.  He said  the only reason he continued to· recei ve 
the money after he became governor was for tax purpose s ,  
but that he d1d net rend �� any servi c e ,  while governo r .  
�o the Foundation.  1'he committee approved the nominat i on 
. 94 by a 13-to-O vot e .  
The Secreta�y o f  Treasury position was t o  start on 
February 1 ,  1971 . 0 n  January 28,  1971 , John B. Connall y ,  J r .  
made h1 s first official statement concerning h i s  new ppsi tion. 
I have no i l lusions about the job the President 
has asked me to take--it i s  tough , complex, and 
i mportant . I approach 1 t  wi th the deepest humility ,  
and I pledge whatever talent , abi l i ty and. energies  
I have to doing 1t  well , for the benefi t  of
.
all 
the peopl e .95 
Connally seemed from the begi nning t o  fulfill thi s stat ement . 
Connally brought i n  t o  t he Treasury Department , not 
only hi s energies ,  but also hi s dynamic  personali t y .  Presi­
dent Nixon has been known to be hard . to get in touch with 
even by hi s own cabinet members , so Connally had a task to 
do i n  breaking down t�e barricades around the President . 
Since the former Secretary of Treasury, David K ennedy, was 
not a colorful person, the Treasury Department did  not have 
much recognit i on .  W hen C onnally took control he told hi s 
. staff ,  "Let ' s  think , l et ' s  plan, l et ' s  propose and l et ' s  
94 .. Rough Road t o  t he Treasury , "  Business Week, 
February 6, 1971 , p. 1 7 .  
� 
95 .. statement o f  the Honorabl e John B. Connally 
.Nominee-Designate for Secretary of the �reasury before the 
Senate Finance Comm1 ttee , "  Department of the Treasury News . 
January 2 8 ,  1971 , p .  2 • 
.. \ 
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96 make • em react to us . "  Obviously, Connally hoped Presl dent 
Nixon would not be able to i�nore these acti ons. 
Not only d id "1e bring hl s i nt el 11ge!'lce to the new 
office, but also h i s  �harisma. John Connally has al ways 
had the kind of personality that draws oeople to him. � i nc e  
most of Nixon ' s  administration had a lackluster quality 
a'tx>ut them , Connally �oved right out i n  fr�nt with both the 
media and Congress . In the first four and one-half months 
in office,  S ecretary Connally �ppeared before eight een 
congressional committ ees, and his words were said to carry 
9 7 " politi cal wallop." He made quite an impression on the . 
committees he was t estifying before by treating· them special. 
Connally didn ' t  relax in the wi tness chair, but sat 
straight on the edge of his seat for hours at a 
stretch, all business alert ,  respectful, performing 
a ritual with due regard for the raok of men facing 
him. He made them feel important , 9� . 
He got along with everyone on the hill, but he was strict 
with whomever he dealt. 
Richard J. Whalen, Nixon ' s  former speech writer 
and advi ser, reports that Connally established two rules 
for his staffs he expected loyalty at all times, and he 
99 wanted to know what ·was going on in the office at all ti.mes . 
. He did not want any surprises. 
He has been recognized as a " quick study" and there-
fore needed l ittle t i m e  to learn the i ns and outs of hi s new 
96"R1s1ng �tar, " p .  23. 
98Fowlkew� p. 19 80 . 
97whalen 
99whalen 
' 
' 
p. 36. 
p·. J6. 
J8 
.1ob. Representative Barbe.r B .  Conable, J r .  ( R-N. Y . ) , .  a 
member of the Joint Economi c s  Committee and the House Way� 
and Means Committee , said , . " He • s damn �ood� He can absorb 
a tremendous amount ot' 1nformat1 on , and he ' s  not one of the3e 
people who , like a blot ter , will soak up everything but e;9t 
it all backwards . .. 100 
Because of his talents, Nixon soon realized his 
potential in the cab1riet and named him chief economic spokes-
man for the President' s  new economic programs on June 2 9 ,  
1971 . Through hi s entire speaking career Connally has been 
able to adapt to various groups on a great number of subjects . 
One of Connally ' s  favorite parables tells of a new preacher 
being questioned by the elders of the ch�rch in a small 
Texas commun1 ty . one of th.em asked, ••Do you believe in the 
di vine c.reation or do you hold that man. descended f!om 
monkeys?" Not knowing which was the proper answer , he finally 
swallowed hard and said solemnlya "Deacon, I can preach it 
101 
either way. "  Connally does not see a problem i n  repre-
sent1ng a R e_publican admini stration even with hi s Democratic 
background . A pparently,  President Nixon felt the same way 
and called on Connally to us.e his Texas rhetoric and hi s 
. . 
political � ckground to sell the administrati on ' s  policies to 
the American people . 
lOO� connall y ' s  Hard Sell a�aihst Inflation, "  Business 
World, July 10� 1 0 71 , p .  6 2 .  · 
1�1Hall, p. 8 • 
. \ 
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Nixon has actually call ed Connally hi s " quarterback" 
while the 
.
Pres1der.t assumed the " role of the coach •
11 102 
In less than eight m0nth� Connally rose to become .  as the . . 
National Journal def1  r.ed, " Presidential confidant with in­
fluence reaching far· beyond hi s official jurisd i ction . .. lOJ 
Not only was he now the spokesman for the President's 
economi c  policy, but he also helped formulate both the r.ew 
domestic ·  and the new foreign policies Nixon advanced. 
. . 
The entire. domestic policy that Nixon announced on 
August 15 , 1971 , dealing with price fixing and the new 
Cost of Living Council was decided at Camp David by Nixon 
with Connelly ' s  help. J ohn D. Ehrlichman, then assistant 
to the President . for domestic affairs, when asked how much 
credit could be given to Connally for the new domestic 
pol i cy ,  said in an i nterview, "Oh ,  I think a substantial 
� 
amount • • • •  the Secretary urged a readiness to activism 
th .. 1 04 en. 
Most accounts say Connally was at hi s best at the 
hour-long press conference on August 1 6 ,  1971 , to explain 
Nixon' s  new domestic economic policy [ Nixonomics]. He 
appeared and explained changing a policy he had publicly 
. . 
opposed a month earlier. He used his Texas rhetoric he 
had learned s humor, sarcasm , and a lot of plain talk. 
He appe.ared comforta'hle in the spotlight • 1 05 
102Fowlkes, p. 1 9 8 8 .  
104ifall, ".p . 8 .  
l0 3I b1d. , p .  199 8 .  
l05Dugger, p. 83 . 
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Ronnie �ugger , i n  The Atlant i c ,  wri tes that C�nnally 
1 s  not at h1 s best i n  formal speeches ,  ones using tr1t� 
ideas and nebulous word s like " extremel y , "  11 paramount , 11 
and " dramatic , "  And " t alking very qui ckly,  like a boxer 
feeding a batt ery of short jabs , he can wind up and deli ver, 
as t hough it were t he · sockeroo of the evenin g ,  the most 
106 reverberating nul11t·y . "  But off the podium he i s  relaxed 
and charming , using ·rexas colloquial i sms.  · 
Connally was also trying to redirect a threat t o  
United Stat es ' s economics--economic  competi t i on from Japan, 
Europe , and Canada . Thi s  i s  where most cri tics  of Connally 
felt· he would have problems , because he had never had to 
deal wit h  i nt ernati onal financi ers . Connally di sagreed . 
"Int ernational relati ons are a discourse between peopl e ,  
and people are basically the same the world over . 0 1.07  
During hi s months .as Secretary of Treasury ,  he 
advanced a new trade offensive for the United Stat e s ,  H e  
wanted the United S tates to get a fairer treatment by 
prosperous foreign countries .  He  wanted t hese countries 
to open their ·markets t o  Uni ted Stat es ' s trade the way the 
United States did after World War I I . Connally said fir�l y ,  
I 
·"The simple fact i s  that i n  many areas others are outpro-
108  
ducing , outth1nk1ng "t; s ,  outworking us and out trading u s . "  
106Fowlke s ,  D ,  1990 . 
l0 7" New U . S .  Campaign , "  Newswe�k, May 31 , 1971 , p ,  6 3 ,  
108" Shultz" ?has1ng in on Phase Two , "  Newsweek, 
May 29 , 1972,  p ,  63 , 
41 
Th1 s hard-nosed att1 tude t·oward th.e world • s central 
. . 
bankers made hi m ,  as Connally h1msel f expressed , a " bully 
boy on the man1 cured play1 ng fields of i nt ernational fi­
nanc e . !•1 09 It ls r�ci surpr1se h1 s reslgnat1on from the 
cabinet posi tion was � reeted with reli ef by i nt ernational 
fi nanceers and the open market gold prices rose to a record 
$57 . 75 an .ounce . 11 0 
I t  was-a surpri se to most that after eighteen months 
in office Connally abruptly resi�ned � P.owever , �ohn Osborne , 
writing for the New Reou bli c sai� Connally 11 had arranged to 
quit before or around this time when he j oined the Cabinet 
111 in December, 1970 . "  President Nixon had nothing but 
prai se for C onnally at C onnelly ' s  final cabinet meeting.  
" No member of t he Cabinet i n  an eighteen-month period ha s 
contri buted more t o  thi s country than has Secretary 
Connally. 11 112 
A fter leaving the Cabinet post , Connally helped 
rai s e  funds and votes for President Nixon ' s second success-
ful bid for the Pres1d ency with the help of "Democrats for 
Nixo n . "  He also made foreign tri ps for the President a s  
109r bid . 
ll Oi bi d .  
lllJ .  O sborne , "Ready for Moscow , "  New R epubl i c , 
May 2 7 ,  1972 ,  p .  9 .  
112°�o·n!1ally !\U Revoir,  11 Newsweek , May 29 , 1972 , 
p.  JO . 
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an ambassador-at-larg e .  A t  the age of f i fty- six , he .had 
gone ba�k to Texas to establ i sh hi s l i fe once again on 
hls ranch outside Floresville,  Texa s .  
Until May bf 1973  he remained somewhat in the 
.background , In May John B .  Connally decided to switch hi s 
pol i t i cal support offi cially and align himsel f with the 
R epubl ican party . When asked i f  he had any ambi ti ons toward 
the Presidency he explai ned , "We all serve i n  different 
way s .  John �ilton said ' They also serve who only stand 
11 3 and wai t . •  Hopefully that ' s  the role I can play . "  
I f  thi s i s  hi s philosophy i t  i s  a new role for 
Mr.  Con�ally.  _ He has already , si nee the sw1 tch,  bee� named 
the new Foreign and Domestic Advi sor to President Nixon . 
Thi s coming ·at a t ime when the Watergat e scandal has· eliminated 
a great many in Washington leaves him very close t o  the 
number one position i n  the country for 1976.  
113James Rest on . " J ohn Connall y  tries t o  enter very 
softly , "· Chi cago 'fr1 � ,  May 6 ,  1973',} sec . 2 ,  p .  5 .  
CHAPTER l l I  
·rHE: MONETARY CRISIS 
On August 1 5 ,  1 9 71 ,  President Ri chard M .  Nixon 
devalued the American dollar. The only other t ime i n  
United States• history that this had been done was i n  1934 
when the late Frankl in D .  Roosevelt cut the value of the 
dollar 41 percent whi ch raised the price of gold to $35 
l per ounce .  Domestically, the fi rst devaluation had little 
effect on the economy , but thi s did l ead the way to making 
the United States' price of gold the cornerstone of the 
internati onal monetary system . 
Thi.s establ i shment of t he dollar a s  the international 
monetary cornerstone came. about after World War II , when 
forty-f�ur of the leading nati ons came to Bretton Wood s ,  
New Hampshire t o  attempt to solve the i nternational economic 
. . . 
problems that arose after the war . Emerging from this 
meeting. came two institutions , the International Bank for · 
Reconstruction and Development ( IBRD ) and the International 
Monetary Fund { IMF) . 2 
l" The Quiet 'l'riumph of Devaluation , "  Time, December 2 7 ,  
1971 ,  p • .  2 2 .  
2M ord·echai � .  Kreinin,  International Economics  A 
Poli cy Approach ( Ch1ca�o1 Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc . •  
1971) ,  p .J:35. 
. 
4J 
44 
One was to help reconstruct Europe and eventually 
finance economi.c devel opment in war torn countri e s ,  the 
Internati onal Bank f6r R econstruct l on · and Development 
.., 
( IBRD r ,  Thi s Bank WO!"k s ·very si mpl y .  Lendi ng natl ons 
give capital stock l n  prooorti on to thel r economic  imoortanc� 
and then the Bank uses this capital to mqke loans to people 
or countri es whose proj ects seem economically sound , at 
reasonable low interest rates . 'l'he IBRD has be.en finannially 
successful through the years . 3 
The si ster institution. has not been so fortunate.  
I t  is  called the Internati onal Monetary Fund ( IMF ) .  I t  
was to establish  t he ba s i c  rules and o�ganization of post­
war financing , with an emphasi s of cooperation among nati ons . 
Eventually 114 nations s�bscribed to an agreement . that 
establi shed an " ad justable . peg" or "gold exchange" system . 
Under this system each n�tion agreed to peg the relative 
value of i t s  currency by fixi ng 1 t.s " parity" value in terms 
4 
of gold , Various ratios were set up wi thin the IMF countries 
with. the Uni ted States•  dollar being the stable uni t .  
Private citi zens and organizations were permitted 
to export , import , transfer fund s ,  and invest abroad . Thi s  
forced the nati onal governments to maintai n a stable exchange 
rat e by their operation in the foreign exchange market 
3rbid . 
4Fred D .  Levy J r .  and Sidney e .  Sufrin ,  Bas i c  
Economics ( Evanston& Harper & Row, 19'1J ) , p ,  J'i 7 .  
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( sometimes buying up their own currency, someti mes sell ing 
a lot of thei r curr�ncy ) . 5 
Tqe exchange rate was allowed to fluctuate wi thin 
a " band" of plus- or-minus one perc�nt around the peg; a 
nati on;  however, was allowed to devalue i t s  currency up to 
ten percent ' at i·ts own di scretion . .All of these fixed rules 
that were establi shed in 1944 would eventually snap because 
6 of i t s  rigidity.  
In the late · 194o • s  and 1950 ' s  the Uni ted States 
was helping foreign count·ri es with the Marshall Plan and 
other aid programs that unpredi ctably thrust these countries 
into an unequaled productivity growt h .  Thi s rapid production 
continues today . 7. 
The beginning of 1971 saw the di sappearance of the 
United States •  trade surplus. The United States has seen 
her abundance of wealth i_n the 1 950 ' s  become a " dollar glut" 
or draining of gold i n  the 1960 ' s  and 1970 ' s . The " dol lar 
glut" has several causes . 8 The growth . of competitiveness 
of foreign economies,  plus the_ expense of America ' s  cold-
' . 
war. programs ( Korea;. Vi e�nam, NATO ) , and our civilian foreign-
aid programs , are added to the large outflow of d i rect �oreign 
\ '  
investments by· Ameri can corporations abroad . Thi s  has gotten 
so bad that between 1 949 and 1970 the international reserve 
51 bid', 
7Kre1n1n ,  p. 1 35 .  
6 I b1 d , , p .  398 . 
8 . 6 I bi d • , p .  1 3 , 
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pos1 ti on of the United St.ates fel l from $26 billion to less 
than $14. 5 billi on ,  with the d �fici t mounting through 1971 .
9 
. . 
An iMF meeting on January 1 ,  1970 tried to enlarge 
international reserves and stabilize international trade by 
using Special Drawing flights ( SDR ) . Each country , .according 
to its  contribution to the IMF, was given reserve assets 
to draw on i f  needed . Thi s was to supplement gold , dollars , 
. and other key currencies . I t  was backed , not by gold bullion, 
but with a rati onal group of people saying they would accept 
the " paper mone y . "  However , the U nited Stat es'  balance 
of payments defi cit rose to . $10 billion i n  1970 ,  the highest 
10 
annual defi c1 t u p  to that time ·. 
International financiers knew it  would be only a 
matter of time before the United Stat es would be .forced to 
devaiue the dollar, so they began shifting their assets 
into other currencie s .  There was over $1 billion o f  S pecial 
Drawing R ights lost each month by the United States . 11 
When Secretary Connally took office i n  February of 
1971 he was faced with all these international monetary 
problems . Connally i s  an undogmati c pragmat ist . When he 
came i nt o  the Secretary of Treasury office ,  he did not �ave 
9Levy and Sufrin, p .  400 .  
10oan1el R .  · Fusfeld , Economics ! Lexington, Massachusetts1 
n; c .  Heath and Co� �any , 1972), p. 875 • 
. 11I bi d . 
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preconceived ideas about how the pol i ci e s  shoul� be �ormu­
lated . Treasury econom i c  advi sor Henry c. Wall i ch thou�hr, 
this was not harmful . " Conn.�lly picks up econom i c  ar�urr.ents 
quickly • • •  Hi s leek of back�round seems to have been 
no. l iabili �Y for h i m .  1 2  I am qui 't e  i!npresse<l . "  He went 
about getti ng opinions from several experts on his  staff , 
speci fi cally Paul A • .  Volcker, an expert in i nternati onal 
monetary pol i c y ,  and also from many · i n  C on�res s .  
Connally also brought into the picture a poli t i cal 
pol i cy i ncorporate4 i nto the United Stat es•  economic policy .  
He  believes most economi c  problems have poli t i cal overtones . 
I n  referring to int ernat ional problems ,  he sai d , " Whether 
you are talking about d efense sharing, ·trade problems or · 
monetary problems ,  ulti matel y  they elevate to the point 
where they become of �he highest pol itical interest to 
the nations i nvolved . "  l J  
When he took office a s  Secretary of Treasury he 
expressed hi s goal for the Internati onal Monetary situation 
to the $enate Finance Commi ttee . 
We can achi eve a stable international financial 
position ,  with a strong dollar , without compromising 
our important domestic objectives . We can h�ve a 
12Frank v. Fowlkes , " Economi c Re port/Connally 
Revi tali zes Treasury , assumes Steward shi p of Nixon ' s  new 
eco�omic pol i cy , "  Nati onal Journal , October 2 ,  1971 , 
p.  1990 . . 
1 31 b1 d • ' p .  19 9 3 . 
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maximum of free trade in the world without damagin� 
the appropriate interest of U ni t ed States•  workers 
and business .  1 4  
I n  late RPr� ng , after the · dollar-exchange-rate 
cri sis i n  curope whi �h brough� a bout the United States '  
new economic ool i c y ,  Connally was asked to  address the 
meeting of 1nternati·or.al bankers ln Muni c h ,  Germany . The 
heads of most of the world ma j or banks would be there as 
well as lending monetary official s .  This was to be Connaily ' s  
first chance t o  tell both American bankers and i nternati onal 
bankers two t hings:  how he saw the problems of the inter-
national monetary pol i c i e s ,  and what the Uni ted States . 
proposed as the solution to the probl em .  
Connally planned to join other American officials 
at the Munich meeting. However , according to Ri chard J .  · 
Whalen, former speech writer for President Nixon, several 
important people i n  Washington tri ed to persuade him to stay 
home. · Wilbur Mil.l s  wanted Connally to be a lead-off wi tness 
on revenue shari ng for him .  He declined . Then Senator 
' 
Fulbright wanted him as. a witness for the hearings he was 
holding .  Agai n a pol i t e  decline . Then chrlichman called 
and said . the Preside.nt was expect1 ng Connally to test1 fy for 
t he Admini strat ion ' s  revenue- sharing · bil l .  H e  said h e  was 
14"Statement of the Honorabl e· John B .  Connally 
Nominee-Designate for .secretary of the Treasury before the Senate Finance C omm1 ttee , "  The D epartment o·f the 
Treasury New s ,  January 2 8 ,  1971 , p .  2 .  
49 
sorry , he was going to �unl ch. And when Ehrlichman called 
back agai n ,  Connal ly . �orrectly .assess1 ng the priorities, 
refused the call , 1 5  
When talki.r� with Allen Wad ;3 ,  a publ l c  relations man 
for the Treasury Department , the wri ter fo�ry� that u sually 
when Secretary Connelly prepared to give a s peech , there . 
were seven or eight technical speech writers who would write 
a draft , Then Connally would read t hem and make suggestions, 
each time returning them for refinement until they came 
up with a speech that he could add his finishing touches 
t 16 o .  
I n  the case of the Munich speech , Mr. Wade said that 
Connally ·was not at all pleased wi th the fi nal draft of the 
speech when it was given to htm before he boarded the plane 
to Munich , When the plane arrived in Germany, Secretary 
Connal°ly, Paul A .  Vol ck er , the •rreasury Department •. s numb�r 
t hree man, and Cal Brumley, another aide , went to the hotel 
and sat up all night composing .a completely new speech. 
Connally wanted to be sure that what he was going to t ell 
I 
his audience would be exactly the way he would say it him-
self • 17 
15R .  J. Whal �n , "Nixon-Connally .arrangement, "  H�.rper ; August, 1971, p ,  36 . · 
l6Allan Wad e ,  telephone conversation with this 
writer on May 20 , l 1 '1 3 .  · 
l 7I bid. 
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On May 2 8 ,  1 9 71 ,  M r .  Connally gave one of the· most 
preci sely worded soeeches of his Trea sury career. He spoke 
t o  the International ronetary Conference of the American 
Bankers A ssociati or. . '!'he heads of most of  the world • s ma'jor 
banks were present & �  well as leadi ng monetary offi cial s .  
Th�re was an obvious absence of W est Germany ' s Economics 
Finance Mini �ter , Karl Schiller. �pparently Mr. Schi ller 
was anti c i pating an attack upon W est Germany for recently 
detaching i t s  mark from i t s  f ixed d ollar peg and permitting 
1 8  
the pri ce t o  float upward . 
While wai t i ng to hear Connally the group also heard 
Arthur F .  Burns ,  chairman of the Fed eral Reserve Board , 
who stressed the need for an effecti ve i ncome pol icy in 
. . . 
. · 1 9  the Unit ed States t o  check wage and price i ncreases . 
When Secretary Conn&lly . spoke he d i d  tell the bankers 
that the Uni ted States had· " the right to expect" fairer 
trade arrangements and more equitable sharing of qefense 
cost s .  He was very tough in h i s  speech, but he had a reason 
for 1 t t o  be worded as i t  was : ·" I  think all too often we 
speak in ambiguous language that can ?e i nterpreted i n  too 
many d i fferent way s .  I d on ' t think you fall out with any� 
20 body because they · und er stand what you mean . "  
1 811connally Tells  Bankers U . S .  W ill Defend Dollar, " 
The New York Times , May 29,  1971 , p.  28 .  
20 .. Moneyi 
October 11 , 1971 . 
A Move Towara Di sarmament , "  Time,  
\ 
·. 
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Foreign mini sters and bankers,  not accustomed to 
blunt demands , were " outraged by Connally ' s ·unyi elding tones 
. 
21 and unva�nished dem��ds , "  Some were heard to mutter 
" arrogance" . and " boort shness-. "  Even some in ."
't he Uni ted 
States feared that Connally ' s  lac� of any use of nuances 
could lead to retaliatory move s ,  or at least poli ti cally 
. 22 . dangerous di srupti ons of  .traditi onal global alliances . 
Thi s marked the beginning of a complet e alt ering of 
the old Bretton Woods agreement. A short time l�t er, at 
the re�om.mendati on and strong urging· of Secretary Connally, 
t he Unit ed States devalued the dollar, twice, and slapped 
a t en percent surtax on all 'imports. The world economy 
i s  i n  such flux now that i t ' i s  diffi cult to surmise how far-
reachi ng the complete effects of t hi s  speech. But i t· all 
started on May 28, 1971. 
Chapter I V  pregents a rhetorical analysi s of thi s 
i mportant speech delivered by Secretary of Treasury John 
Connally. 
21 .. The R i sing Star From Texa s , "  Time, October 1 8 ,  
1971, p .  2). 
2211 Solvin.'S a C.:ri si sa John C onnally Superstar, " 
Newsweek, December 13 , 1971,  p. 85 .  
C!M PrER J 1i 
.A NALYS I S  A .:-� D  �VALUA TION :'F TBE '.:> P�i::C H  
After an i nvesti �at i on of � r .  Connal l y • s  life � �  
Chapter Two and � look at the milieu of the t i me s  i n  Cha p t e r  
Three . the next step i s  a cri ti cal anal y s i s a n i  evalua t i c �  
of the speech gi ven i n  Munich .  G ermany to the �nternations l 
Banking Conference of the American Bankers A ssociation 
on May 2 8 ,  1971 . To do thi s ,  first , a careful outli ne 
1 of the speech was made .  Next the questionsWayland Parrish 
suggested to help analyze a speci f i c  speech were appl i ed . 
The questions used are the ones that seemed to fit the selected 
speech . If one of the criteri& did  not appl y ,  it was not 
used . 
Discovering whether the speaker used the avai lable 
means of persuasion was done by a categorical questioning 
of the speech . S pecific  emphasis  will be applied to the 
following threes 
1 .  The content of the speech . 
2 .  The speaker ' s  stylistic  device s .  
J .  The speaker • s  delivery . 
Following this bsc\ c format , l et us first examine the 
content of the speech from an overall perspective . The 
1For the conven.1 ence of the read
,'er,  a complete 
text of S ecretary Connally ' s speech appears in A ppendix A .  
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content of the s p e e c h  l s  looked at to fi nd · out what t h e  
s peaker said . fhonsson,  Bai rd .  and brad cn define conte.r.t: 
as 1 nclud i ng s  
• • •  the entire i nvestigative und ertak i ng .  the 
idea of the ' st a tu s , ' and t h e  m o d e s  of persuasion 
--logi cal , emot i onal , and ethi cal-- i n  all of t h e � r 
complex 1 nterrelat i on sh1 p . 2 
The area concern�ng logic �a s broken down m ore 
completely for the purpose of a more thorough investigati o n .  
The sub-points t o  be examined are s 1 )  l'he central thesi s  
and maj or i ssues;  2 )  �he reasoning ; 3 )  The mai n  supporting 
material 1 4) The speech organi zati on ; and . 5) The emotional 
appeal . These will be looked at i n  the criti cal i nvestigation. 
The general purpose of Mr. Connally ' s speech was 
to persuad e .  His  specific  purpose was to actuate the whole  
group of  nati ons to work out a more equitable solution 
to the exi st i ng probl ems by adopt i ng his  suggested cri teria 
for improvement . 
Mr.  Connally was very anxious to relate to the 
' 
Munich aud i ence the sense of urgency he felt regarding 
alteration of the I nternati onal Monetary Pol i ci es as they 
exi sted at the time of hi s speech.  H i s  major i nspiration 
for the i d eas presented i n  the speech were a strong desire 
for a stable internati onal market , a desi re for lessening 
2Lester Thon ssen, A .  Craig Baird , and Waldo w .  
Braden, Speech Cr1 t 1 cj sm ( 2nd ed ; New York s The Ronald 
Pres� C ompany , 1970 f:-P:- 79 . 
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of the financial burden the Uni ted States carried for all 1 
the countri es ,  and a desire to remai n i n  cooperative accord 
with all nat i ons . 
A more comol ete look at the content of the speech 
will be given at this t i me . The question and answer format 
will be used . 
Content 
A .  What was the speaker' s central thesis?  What were the 
i s sues with which he dealt?  
�IJ<"'� 
Connelly ' s  central thesis  was that all IMF countri es 
should join i n  a cooperative venture to relieve strains 
on· the world f i nancial market . To develop thi s beli ef he 
talked a"tx:>ut several bas i c  i ssues . 1 )  The Uni ted States 
has had the full responsi bil i t y  for the economi c growth 
of all the countries ,  2 )  The U nited States i s  now financially 
unable and unwilling to carry the d i s proporti onate financial 
burdens of the IMF countries al one ,  and 3 ) All IMF countries 
should cooperate in meeting the financial burdens of the 
present system . 
-
The first l ine of argument was that the U ni t ed 
States has had the full responsibi l i ty for the economic 
growth of all countries in the past . Development i ncluded 
the following specifi cs :  
1 )  Although the Uni ted Stat es wanted another monetary 
approach , "key currency , "  they went along wi th 
other nations in adopting the IMF .  
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2 )  Later the United Stat es joined i n  the new Special 
Drawing Hights pol i cy .  
3 ) The Uni t ed S : a t es al so hel ped with the Marshall 
Plan. 
4) The Uni ted S t ates al so encouraged their industry 
oversea s .  
5 ) The Uni ted States cont i nues a s  a major capital 
exporter as well as having the most open markets 
in the worl d .  
6 )  The United States makes heavy outlays for defense 
costs in Europe . 
The second section of hi s argumenr contains examples 
of how the Uni t ed States cannot support the IMF countries 
as before because of financial problems and because of a 
d i s proportionate economic cost imposed on her . Development 
i ncluded the following specifics a  
1 )  The United States has an underlying [ trade] 
deficit--running at $2 to $3 billion a year. 
2) The fixed exchange rates and freely convertible 
currenci es are threatening the Uni ted States 
economy. 
3 )  The Uni t ed States has tried t o  bring their in­
flation under control by raising taxes and 
rai sing interest rates higher than any time 
in the last hundred years . 
4)  Domest ic costs have been heavy--economic slack, 
low profit s ,  and high unemployment . 
5 ) Nearly $5 bill ion goes to financing a military 
shi eld for Western Europe and Japan.  
6 )  The Common Market , Japan, and Canada do not 
have open markets for the products of other 
countries .  
The thi rd section proposed the � solution to  the 
arguments by suggesting that all countri es cooperate i n  
\ 
meeting the financial burdens of the present system, to 
maintain a stable monetary system . Development included 
the following speci f t c s s  
1 )  We must resnor.d with a recognition of mutual 
needs and confidence--no monetary or economic 
isolat i on. 
2) We have the right to expect more equitable 
trading arrangements. 
3 ) We expect other IMF countries to accept the 
responsibility to share more fully in the 
cost of defending the free world. 
B .  What was the reasoning used? 
The reasoning S ecretary Connally used was quite 
sound . Secretary Connelly' s  three contentions in his basic 
line of argument were developed through argument by deduction. 
Each of the three parts of his basic argument were developed 
by example . This form of reasoning consists of drawing 
conclusions about a general class of objects by studying 
individual members of that class . 3 
Connally chose specific examples of the incon-
si stencies throughout the IMF countries to show that the 
contention i s  true , i. e . 1  
We lead repeated effort s to cut tariffs multi­
laterally, while continuing to accept the pleas 
of Japan and the Common Market that maj or areas 
of their economi c s  should be shi elded from inter­
national competition . 
�lan H .  �onroe, Principles and Types of S
�
eech 
( 5th eds Chicagos Scott, Foresman and Company , 1 9 2r:­
p. 425 . 
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There seem to be suff 1cient amounts of examples through-
out the speech to wa�rant the general proposition to be 
valid. The speech ha3 sound reaso�i ng. 
c .  What verbal supports in the speech were used? 
Monroe , in Pr1ncioles and Tynes of Speech, defines 
the forms of support as the types of speech material which 
are used to amplify, clarify, or prove a statement in order 
to make it more illumi�ating or convincing to an audience. 4 
In general, there are seven forms of verbal support 
which may be used to develop the ideas in a speechs 
1 .  Explanation--" • • •  a simple, concise exposition, 
setting forth the relation between a whole and 
its parts or making clear an obscure term. " 
2 .  Analogy of Comparison- -This is where " . • •  
similarities are pointed out between that which 
is already known, or believed, and that which 
is not. " · 
3 . Statistics--" . • •  figures used to show the 
proportion of instances of a certain kind, to 
show how many or few or great or small they 
are. " 
4. Illustration--" • . •  a detailed example of the 
idea or statement to be supported. It is the 
narration of an incident to bring out the point 
you are trying to make. There are two principle 
types of illustrations The hypothetical and the 
factual. The former tells a story which could 
have happened or probably will happen i the latter 
tells what actually has happened. " 
5 .  Specific instances--" • • •  are condensed forms 
of factual iJ lustrations. They are undetailed 
examples. " 
4 I bid • , p • 1 9 5 • 
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6 .  Testimony--"Another person' s statement used to 
support the ideas of the speaker • • . " 
7 .  R estatement--"  • • •  saying the same thing , but 
saying i t  1 n  R different way . " 5  
A s  noted above Secretary Connally used specific  
instances to develop his  li nes of argument s .  He used 
stat i st i c s  as well t o  show the amount o f  money the Uni ted 
Stat es was expending to her detri ment . 
-- • • •  our underlying def i ci t--running at $2 t o  
$ 3  bill i on a year. 
-- • • •  unemployment of five million people • • •  
--The recent short-term borrowing of $3 bi llion 
by the Treasury and the Export- Import Bank are 
a case in point . 
Explanation was used to underscore the probl ems 
the countries face . When Secretary Connall y  was talking 
about the " serious business at a serious t ime" he explained , 
W e  are aware of the strains upon the monetary frame­
work upon which we all depend t o  carry on our inter­
national commerc e .  
These monetary tensions are a warni ng . Elements 
of internat ional monetary cooperation, built with so 
much effort in the postwar period , are being questioned . 
Later he det1ned an all i ed internati onal economy by ex­
plaining i t  " implies  some squeeze on independent national 
act i on . "  Connally again explained by definition when talking 
of the Uni ted States support of " key currency . "  
A rguing essentially that the economic ascendancy of 
the Uni t ed States justi f i ed enshrining a kind of 
informal dollar-sterling standard with other 
currencies assuming a �ore or less permenent 
subsidiary rol e .  [ si c] 
5Ibi d . , pp. 1 95- 2 0 7 .  
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These are just some of  the ex planations Secretary Conna l l y  
used in his speech. 
S ecretary r o � nal l y  used t h � e e  nrobl�m solvin� i d �b 3  
.. 
in his speech. They n�e presented i n  a par allel con-
struction. Had A mer t �a paralleled other lN? actions, s h 0  
would have 
--By heavily pro�ecting our ma�ket 
--By sharply cutting our aid , a�d 
--By retreating into a "Fortress .America'; 
£here is only one use of testimony i n  the speech 
and that really was only a quotation by Patrick Henry of 
how Connally felt he should approach the speech. " I  know 
of no way of j udging the future but by the past. " 
The comparison was used by Connally to make very 
revealing juxtap·osi tions. 
Excess demand has given way to economic slack, low 
profits, and unemployment of five million people, 
more than the entire labor force of the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Switzerland. 
Certainly, it would make little sense to ask for 
high interest rates in the United States at the 
expense of more unemployment, and at the same time 
bless higher rates of interest to use that weapon 
to combat inflation. 
The comparison, showing what the United States was 
like after World War I I ,  was well done. Then Connally 
used an extension of that comparison to what the other IMF' 
nations did in the same period. And, fi nally, the t hi rd 
comparison i� this series was the view of what the United 
States would have been like as an isoldtionist instead o f  
being the. help it was to the other -nations. These were 
complex comparisons but very worthwhi le i n  the scheme o f  
supporting C onnal ly · �  argument s .  
I n  evaluat j �.>.; Con�ally ' s  u se of e v i d e n n e , there rire 
a number of conclus1o�s whi ch can be reached . Fi rst , tne 
fact s seemed good su pport for the argume�t s he set forth, 
although he used quite a bit of h i s  unsupport ed opini on 
in the proof as wel l :  second , the i nferenc es he drew from 
the exampl es seemed justifiable; a�d third ,  the logi cal 
structure was arranged in such a way that i f  the l i steners 
accepted hi s inferences,  they would have been ea si ly i n-
flue,nced . 
D. Was the speech well organized in gen�ral? 
Connally used the typi cal Introduction, Di scussion, 
v 
Conclusion organi zation i n  hi s speech very effectively . 
The analysi s i s  relatively simpl e  because he was aware of 
the need for good organi zation .  
There were two Introductions Secretary Connally 
used i n  the Munich s peech.  He  established common ground 
with hi s audi ence in two way s .  First , he made general 
re�erences to the pleasantness of the conference and the 
hospital ity of the country . 
Then he referred to the problems the United States 
and other IMF nati ons have had in common , 
--But we are here on> serious business at a serious 
time . '  
--It i s  easy to understand how one) country or 
another can be tempted to shirk its  responsibi l i t ies 
to , the international communi ty . 
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--A stable monetary order requires nations to 
know and acceot the • rules of the game . •  
The speech and di rectness by whi ch Connally surges i nto 
the subject suggest s he wants to be brief and forthright . 
Also i t  l ets the audi ence know that a solution to the problem 
i s  expected quickly .  
A fter Connally recognized the problem at hand he 
moved to the "Di scussion" phase .  Connally chose the problem-
solution approach in his speech development . Beginning 
with a chronological approach he explained the problems 
the United States faced by first going back to post-World 
War II actions by the United States in their aid to other 
IMF countri es . Then he gradually progressed to present 
day when the problems stemming from that aid had , i n  hi s 
opinion, gotten out of hand . 
The " Solution" segment of the sequence used a special 
topical sequence whi ch points out a series of qualities  
or functions of  the solution that should be adopted . The 
areas where new European financial emphasis should be given 
were i n  military support and tradi ng arrangemen t s ,  These 
are the two areas where there was the biggest dollar drain 
\ 
for the Unit ed States,  and Connally felt this l evel was no 
longer acceptabl e .  
The possibl e  solutions the United States saw were 
somewhat l imited by what they held as an unalterable 
' 
position .  Connally first said that any solution must have 
a flexi bi.l i  ty and ·second i t  should have brought about a 
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financial order i n  the IMF . But t he Uni ted States showed 
i t s  inflex i bi l i ty i n  the solution by demanding a sterl i ng 
aspect for the dollar .  
Hel pful t o  any solution of any problem i s  the under­
standing t hat these are necessarily some unalterabl e 
positions of any parti c i pant . Beli eving t hi s ,  I 
want wi thout arrogance or defiance t o  make i t  
abundantly clear that the Nixon Admini stration i s  
d ed i cated to assuring the int egri t y ,  and maintaining 
the strength of the dollar . 
Then Connally demands these accommodations: 
But , as you share in the system , we have the right 
t o  expect more equitable trading arrangement s .  
We also expect you t o  accept the responsibil i t y  
t o  share more fully i n  the cost of defending t he 
free world . 
Finally • • • that increased cooperation among 
us all must play a key role i n  maintai ning a stable 
monetary system. 
The "Conclusi on" made the final · pitch for the new 
proposals the United Stat es had mad e .  The consequences 
were impl i ed i f  these conclusions were not accepted . When 
everyone left the meet i ng they were very much aware the 
United States was going to be looki ng for drast i c  changes 
to be made i n  the International Monetary Pol i cies  as soon 
as possibl e .  
E .  What motive appeals did the speaker use? 
Monroe defi nes motive appeals as " that which appeals  
t o  all specific sentiments ,  emotions and desires by whi ch · 
the speaker may set the primary motives i nto action. 6 
6 I bi d . ,  p .  1 70 .  
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Parrish cal l s  the most persuasive speaker one who " most 
effecti vely directs h i s  appeal to the basic interest s ,  
7 desires, wants , instinct s ,  and emotions o f  his hearers . "  
I n  the speech at Mun i c h ,  Connally framed hi s motive appeals 
1n a manner whi ch would produce immediate act i on i n  the area 
he suggested . He did this by a ppeal i ng mainly to the emotions 
of fair play, fear , and uni t y .  
Connally spoke of fair play to hi s aud i ence when he 
suggested to them that all nations might want to shi rk 
responsi b i l i t i e s  but , he impl i ed ,  cannot for the good of 
all eountries . 
It i s  easy to understand how one country or 
another can be tempted to shirk i t s  responsibi l i t i e s  
to t h e  i nternati onal community , , • A stable 
monetary order requires nati ons to know and accept 
the ' rul e s  of the game , •  
He later mentioned the idea of ·what wi l l  not bring about 
fair play. " Money • • • cannot assure fair and equitable 
trading cond i tions • • • •  What matters most i s  the spirit 
and attitude we each bring to thi s task . "  
Connally asked h i s  audi ence a series of rhetorical 
questions geared to showing that the nat ions that had not 
done their share i n  the past , should act i n  a fair way now . 
7wayland M .  Parri sh,  The Study o f  S peeches , "  Speech 
C r i t i c i sm s  Methods and Material s ,  ed . by W illiam A .  Linsley 
{Dubuque, Iowas Wm . c .  Brown Company Publ i shers , 1968 ) , 
p .  8 8 .  
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--l s i t  natural or i nevi tabl e  that fully JO perc ent 
of t h e  J a panese exports go to the U . S .  market . . 
-- • • •  should r.ot the J a panese consumer have free 
· access to the !"roduct s of the out s i d e  world? 
--Must Canada ma i nta i n  tari f f s  on private purcha ses 
of u . s .  autos t o  a t1me when a bal ance of paym e n t s  
surplus resulted i n  a ' float i ng '  exchange rate? 
-- I s  it ri ght t r.:� t  Uni ted State� aP:ricultural produr;t s 
f i nd access t o  t h e  densely populated cont i nent of 
Europe 1 ncrea s 1 n�ly l i mi t e d ?  
Connally i m pl i ed· i t  would only be fai= t o  �ake a l l  of t hese 
si tuations more equi table for t h e  U n i t ed State s .  In hi s 
conclusion he t e l l s  the audience the American c i t i zens w i l l  
not allow the government to work i n  a system that does not 
recogni z e  the Uni ted S t a t e s  a s  an equal with other count r i e s  
or t h e  world . O f  cours e ,  every t i m e  C onnally mentions 
fair play he implied that the IMF count r i e s  were not d o i ng 
their part . Thi s tended t o  a l i enate peopl e .  
Connally d i d  try t o  make u p  for thi s " blame tact i c" 
by saying that t hi s  was all i n  t h e  pa st . '"rhe relevant 
i ssue i s  not t p  fix blame for how we got where we are--
and then engage i n  destructive recriminat i on s .  W e  need a 
more constructive a pproach . "  Therefor e ,  he gave t h e  nations 
an excuse . t o  justify their pas t  a c t i on s .  
Throughout the speech , Connally tried t o  plant t h e  
feeling of fear o f  danger i n  the m i n d s  of hi. s audi en c e .  
The fear o f  danger has both i t s  pos i t i ve a nd negative 
effec t s 1  i t  may prevent u s  from doi ng things that br i ng 
peri l ,  and i t  may make u s  a c t  to prot ect ourselves aga i n s t  
peril ,  Connally sai d over and over i n ' hi s speech that i f  we 
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d o  not act now, serious consequences will ari s e ,  leaving 
it t o. the minds of t he l l steners to ant i c i pate the probJ em s .  
I n  the introduction to the speech he said a great 
many emotion packed words designed to elicit feari " seri ous 
busi ness , "  .. strai ns , "  " t ensions , "  " d i sturbanc es , "  " revolution , .. 
" d i ff i cult adjustment . "  Of cours e ,  all these d i sturbances 
are building up to Connel ly ' s  plan to allevi at e  the probl ems .  
He used personi fi cat i on i n  explaining the fear he 
had for the enormous short-term money flow i n  the system 
of fixed exchange rates and freely convertibl e  currenc i e s . 
" But now we see signs that t he child of success i s  threatening 
the mother that nurtured i t . "  
Furthur i n  the speech Connally calls attention to 
t he danger they were all faci ng . 
The danger i s  pla i n .  T o  revert t o  the use of 
fixed exchange rates as a supplementary tool of 
domestic pol i cy i s  fraught with danger to the 
essential stabi l i t y 1 and sustainabi l i t y  of the system as a whol e .  
The f ear tact i c s  were used a great many times throughout 
the speech . Apparently Connally felt the audience was not 
aware of the s ituation they were all experi encing or he would 
not have repeated thi s fear technique so many times . Such 
an appeal may have a curvil inear effect: that i s ,  if over-
used , the audi ence may maintain the speaker i s  using scare 
tact i c s  and di scount almost all of what the speaker say s .  
From the reaction o f  the aud i ence ,  aft erward ( noted i n  
Chapter Three)  i t  seems they were not convinced the danger 
' . 
was really a s  pres s i ng as Connally would have them bel i eve . 
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One of the conclusions Connally came to was that uni ty 
will hel p �et the rou�tr1es through these times . 1�e four 
statements noted in t h e  fo.llowinp; i l lustrate his use of 
the "unity appeal. "  
--We must all be concerned with the stab� lity of 
the system and the stabil i ty of the dollar that 
is the cornerstone of the system--whether we 
planned it or not and whether we like it or not . 
--Let us, too, id entify and undertake those joint 
actions necessary to deal with short-term flow. 
--As time and events change . we must respond with 
a recogniti on of mutual needs and conf idence. 
We all must recogni ze there is no more room for 
monetary or economic isolation. 
--It ls to our mutual int erest t o  work out the 
, world ' s  monetary problems so t hat trade and 
commerce may expand and thus support national 
needs, 
All of these statements promote the feeling of unity and 
mutual cooperation. At the same time he was telling them 
that the United States was not going to carry a dispro-
portionate part of the burd en any longer. 
This speech is saturated with emotional a ppeals 
geared to arousing the listerner• s  attention . These appeals, 
and the way Connally presented them. led the audience to 
react in an negative way .  [ Noted in Chapter Three . ] Per­
haps the idea that this was such an abrupt change_from 
saying the United States would always be the guiding l i ght 
was disturbing t o  th�� . The bluntness of the demands for 
cooperation caused problems , although they were nullified 
to some degree by the l everage of Connally ' s  power posi tion . 
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F .  I s  there evidence i n  the speech that the speaker · po s s e ssed 
persuasive qual i t i e �--virtue . intelligence, and good wi l l ?  
Ari stotl e ,  as doe� Parr i sh , holds that there are 
three sources of personal credibility in oratorsz  It I e < 
sagaci t y ,  high character, and good will . "  .And believes t hat 
i f  a person i s  supposed to command them all , he will be 
8 
deserving of cred i t  in the eyes of hi s aud i ence . 
Although thi s was one of the first speeches Secretary 
Connally had ever given before the internati onal bankers, 
he did not take very much time i n  establi shing his authori t y .  
Throughout the speech there i s  a feeling h e  spoke i n  an 
authoratative way , but it seems he let hi s external ethical 
qual i t i e s  establ i sh h i s  authori ty . 
After all , most of the bankers would know the 
i llustrious background of Mr.  C·onnally • .  His close friend-
shi p with President Johnson and his three terms as Governor 
of Texa s .  establ i shes him as a very capable pol iti cal 
representative for the United Stat es . S i nce thi s was hi s 
first major speech before an i nternational aud i ence , he 
did have some ethical proof t o  relay to them . 
He sprinkled the speech with some parenthetical 
expressions that should have establi shed some authority 
with the aud i ence . 
--I int end to deal with these questions openly and 
frankly .  
--Her e ,  I believe we i n  the United States have the 
special responsi bi l i ty to make our approach and 
8Thonssen, Baird , and Braden , pp. 446-447. 
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intenti ons crysLal clear. 1 hope I do so . 
- - I recit e  th1s brief record not to eli cit  
either prai se or thanks • • .  
- - I  want w1thou� arrogance or d efiance to make 
i t  abundantl y �lear • • .  
All of these helped establi sh his authority and/or good 
will wi th the li stenerR, 
Secretary Conr.ally establ i s hed from the beginnin� 
that he knew that all the countries o f  the free world were 
having economic probl ems. Connally offered them sympathy 
and said he could see where i t  might be easy for them to 
rationalize out of doing their part in  world fi nance . " I t  
i s  easy t o  understand how one country or another can be 
t empted to shirk i ts responsi bilit i es to the internati onal 
community i ncluding the maintenance of monetary order . .. 
However , he goes on to show how the United States had tri ed 
to uphold all that was expected of her--even at a loss to 
her people .  
He  mentioned several t imes that all countries should 
be concerned 1 f  there is an internati onal problem, not 
just the countries in trouble . Then he kindly explained 
that he was not pointing the finger at any one country, 
"The relevant i ssue i s  not to fix blame for how we got where 
we are--and then enga�e in  destructive recriminati ons.  We  
need a more constructive approach."  Such statements heloed 
conciliate hi s hearer£ and keep them solution oriented . 
Then hi s approach changed . He specifically told 
the countri es that having become economically successful 
that they should char.ge t h e i r  approach t o  international 
f i nance .  What he a sJ.\ e:i  for i s  more equality i n  trad e .  J\l so 
equal ity 1 n  fi nanc i r.� t he defense of t h e  free world was 
asked f or .  Connel l y  stat.ed that after twenty- fl ve year s  
other countri es should do their part i n  fi nancing troops 
in all ied countri e s .  
The nations o f  W e s t ern Europe and J a pa n  are again 
strong and vigorou s ,  and their ca paciti es to 
contribute have vastly i n creased . 
Although Connally appeared i n  the early part of the speech 
t o  be sympatheti c ,  these points he brought up lead one to 
bel ieve he was al so sure that there would be some probl ems 
i n  get t i ng the countri es he menti oned committed to a chang e .  
But h e  was willing t o  take that risk . 
Agai n he · tried t o  buffer the above accusations by 
saying cooperat i on i s  essential.. ti I t  1 s t o  our mutual 
i nt erest t o  work out the world ' s  monetary probl ems so that 
trade and commerce may expand and thus support nati onal need s .  ti 
C onnall y  understood fully the reaction he would get 
from hi s recommendations to alter the present system and 
t hat i s  why he added warmth and si ncerity t o  thi s .  
A good deal of supporti ve evidence Connally used 
was either historical exampl es or stat i st i c s .  I t  would 
seem that most bankers would already know the hi story of 
American economy , but it added to Connally' s cred i bi l i t y  
for h i m  t o  reiterate the hi story t o  shqw them he was well 
aware of i t ,  especially since he was not known i n  
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int erna t i onal c i rc l e s  as much as he was Texas pol i t i c s .  
A fter �e gave t h e  h i s t ory o f  Uni t ed States mon etary pol l c i � � .  
he stated hi s i nten•. 1 0 n . " I  r e c i t e  t h i s bri e f  record not 
to e l i c i t  ei ther pra � s e or thanks , '' but the unstated m e s s a �, <�  
was clear: he was t el l i n� them i t  w� s now t i me for them t o  
shou l d e r  more of the f i na nc i a l  l oad . 
He used stat i s t i c s  to hi ghl i �ht the fact that the 
Uni t ed States had l o s t  a great d ea l  o f  money i n  the pa st . 
They a l s o  showed where the U n i t ed S t a t e s  was not g e t t i ng 
adequate h e l p  und er the e x i s t i ng pro�ram . I t  would seem 
these stati s t i c s  were well placed to i m press upon the 
' 
audience the research that had been done to clarify hi s 
a s s e r t i ons . 
Throughout Connal l y ' s  speech, he expressed a great 
many statements that were all- i nclus i ve and presumpt i ve .  
S pe c i f i call y ,  h e  sa i d s  
--I think we have a l l  become aware . • . 
--We are aware 
--We a l l  recogn i z e  • • . 
--We must respond • • • 
--We must all be concerned 
These types o f  statements committed the aud i en c e  t o  a 
posi t i on t he y ,  themselves ,  might not have a c c e pted at the · 
ons e t .  
Connally also stated several dogma t i c  po s i t i ons 
whi ch he sai d ,  cannot e nd wi l l  not be altered . Fi rst , w�en 
he talked about Eurod c l lars he stated em.phat i cal ly , " . . . 
' 
we have a right to ant i c i pa t e  that other c entral banks w i l l  
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not themselves add to the market supply of  dollars by · con-
tribut.l ng to the mu1 t 1 nl1 cation of Eurodollars . "  Fi naJ J y , 
in the soluti on he w a s  advocat1n� he unwaverinply said 
t hat " all [ member nat i ons] must play a key rol e . "  Thi s  w a s  
a completely new conceot to most of the audience and i t  
would seem to appear very dogma t i c  to them . 
He dld try to smooth these over by expressing a 
d esire not t o  be insi stent on only or.e aoproach to t he 
problem when he said s  " I  am convinced the solution cannot 
be one-d iminsional . 11 .A lthough he expressly stated thi s ,  
the next major thought seemed to be contrad i ctory , actually 
supporti ng a specific  cri teri on . " But two l i nes of attack 
seem to be both promising and potentially practi cal . In 
combination,  they could go a long way . "  'rhi s dogmatism 
i s  sprinkled throughout the s peech. 
Not so striking was hi s use of overstatement . The 
overstatements were concerning the Uni ted Stat e s '  role in 
foreign monetary matters . 
You will find ,  I beli eve, our record to be a proud 
and constructive one , aimed not at dominance but 
a mutual growth and strength. 
There would be some countries whi ch would d i sagree with t�i s 
statement . Even more might find fault with a later remark: 
We have consistently felt through the years that 
our basic national i nterest l i es in an outward 
orientation of economi c  pol i cy--alert and 
responsive to the needs of others . 
} 
The fault i s  not that the Uni ted States has been helpful 
t o  countri.es ,  but that Connally leaves the questionable 
impression that the United States always helped those i n  need . 
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The second concept u s i ng exaggera t i on was seen 
when S.ecretary Connal ly talked about the U n i t ed States 
cont rol l i ng i t s  i nf l a t \ o n .  He told o f  hr inging t h e  i n­
fl a t i on " under control" and a l s o  that l t  was d i f f i cult t o  
get i t  t o  subside but that " i t 1 s yi eld i np; . "  Perhaps at 
thi s t i m e  Secretary Connally thought the 1 n fla t i on was 
bei ng curbed , but hind s i g h t  has proved him gravely wrong . 
Therefore, t h e s e  statements were unsupported exaggera t i on s .  
These dogmat i c  s t a t ement s ,  exaggera t i ons , and over­
s t a t ements would seem to appear very s t rong and would 
alienate those who l i s t ened to him even i f  what he ini t ially 
wanted t o  say might be worthwhi l e .  
The bas i c  qu esti on asked by Parr i s h  i s  whether 
Secretary Connal ly ' s expressed qual i ti es of virtu e ,  i n t el­
l ig e nc e ,  and good will . To t h i s wri t e r ,  t here i s  no doubt 
that Connally knew that of whi ch he spok e ,  and also that he 
was approaching the si tuation as honestly a s  he could , 
g i ven the i nformat i o n  he had available at the t i m e .  
T h e  probl em , i t  would appear, arose when S ecretary 
Connally used st rong language w i t h  spec i f i c  d emands g i ven 
t o  t h e  aud i ence . T h i s  would not leave the hearers w i t h  a 
bel i e f  that Connally wi shed them good wi l l ,  even i f  h e  
d i d  say that h e  wanted them a l l  t o  work together for a 
better solu t i o n .  A f t er all , these countri e s  should not be 
anx i ous t o  change to a pol i cy for whi c h  they w i l l  have 
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t o  take on add i t i onal responsibi l i t i e s .  A l so they were 
a·skeci to take on a d e 't1t they never had to deal wl th bef or� . 
Perhaps Secretary Connally l o st some ethi cal per�uasion 
w1th thi s strong ap-oroa ch . After a l l ,  Parr i sh admi t s  '' ": h e  
presence or absence of one or more of these qua l i t i e s  may 
d i spose the hearers so favorably or so unfavorably toward 
t he speaker that they pay l i ttle attent i on to what he says , 11 9 
Or,  one might add , they may be so uoset that the worthwhile 
remarks might be over- shadowed by negat ive feeli ngs .  Thi s 
seemed to be the case at Muni ch . 
Now that we have examined the speaker ' s  persua s i ve 
qual i t i e s  l et u s  move t o  the s peaker ' s styl i st i c  devi c e s . 
Styl e 
Styl i st i c  devi ces are words used to i llustra t e ,  
t hrough ornamentation ,  what will win and hold a n  audienc e ' s 
attention. Thi s i s  the qual i ty that Ari stotle descri bed 
a s  " se t t i ng a thing before the eye s . " l O  Parri sh ' s  questi on 
will determine how well Connally used t h i s  qual i ty .  
A .  Were there many styl i st i c  devices used i n  the speech? 
Secretary Connally used imagery i n  hi s speech to 
appeal to the senses and thus create a sensat i on .  He 
painted the picture of the al t ering of the I nt ernat ional 
9 �6 Parri sh,  p. -> • 
10 I bi d . ,  p .  89 . 
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Monetary system by comparing it to materi al 1 II • • • 
wi thout i n  the process tearing apart t he essential fabri� 
of the system and \ n Rt i tutions that serve u s . "  
Connally also uses person i f i cation i n  the speech by 
giving human qual i t \ e s t o  events happening i n  the economy . 
" But now we see signs that the child of success i s  
threatening the mother that nurtured i t . "  
Surpri s i ngly there are f ew col orful statements 
in Connally ' s  s peech . Perhaps i t  i s  because of the urgency 
of the matters at hand or the brevity of the time , but 
Connally chooses to be very expl i c i t  and exact t hroughout .  
r 
He skillfully used repe t i t ion i n  many i nstances 
during the speech . The repe t i t ion of the pronoun " we , "  
" our , "  and " us , '� i s  very noti ceable a s  well as the paral l e l  
structure explaining what the �n i t ed States had don e .  
Our economy i s  large and ri ch . W e  have a high 
l evel of trad e .  Our markets are relatively 
open. our currency i s  a world currency . 
Ag�in when Connally told o f  the unalt erable po s i t i ons 
of the Uni ted Stat e s ,  he said he wanted to clarify the 
point s ,  He did thi s by repet i t i o n .  
We are not going t o  devalue .  
W e  are not goi ng to change the pri ce of gold . 
We are control l i ng our inflat i o n ,  W e  are al so 
stimulat i ng economic growth at a pace which 
will not begin new i nflati on • 
• • • we fully recognize you are not willing 
t o  l i ve wi th a system d i ctated by the Uni t ed 
Stat e s .  
• • • we· have th� right t o  expect more equitable 
trading arra�ement s .  � 
W e  also expect you to accept the respons i bi l i t y  
to share more · fully i n  the .cost o f  defending the 
free· world . 
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A f t er this seri e s  of repet i t i ve stat ement s ,  Connally 
shifted t o  a s er i e s  of rhetorical qu e s t i o n s  about the pol i c l es 
of other nations . i :1ese were mentioned earl1 er i n  the 
criti cal evalua t i on .  
Hi s speech reached a c l i max wi t h  yet another 
parellel structure when he told hi s aud i ence: 
No l onger does the U . S .  economy dominate the free 
world . 
No longer can considerations of friendshi ps , or need , 
or capacity j u s t i fy the Uni t ed States carrying so 
heavy a share of the common burd ens • 
. • • no longer will the American people perm i t  
t h e i r  government t o  engage i n  i nt erna t i onal a c t i ons 
i n  whi c h  the true long-run interests of the U . S .  
are not just a s  cl early recognized a s  those of the 
nations with whi ch we deal . 
These all seem t o  explain expl i c i t l y  the Uni t ed 
Stat e s •  posi t i on without leaving doubts i n  t he l i st ener ' s  
m i nd a s  t o  what poi n t s  Connally was trying t o  mak e .  Secretary 
Connall y ,  w i t h  hi s legal background , simply l i sted the major 
arguments he wanted t o  carry t o  the audience by use of 
repeti t i o n .  He d i d  thi s well and suc c i n c t l y .  The lack 
of f l owery d e s cri pt i ve phra s e s  only t ended t o  underline the 
seriousness of the t i m e s . 
Hi s styl e was " spoken" a s  opposed t o  "wri t t en . "  
He used s i mple and compound sentences wi th personal references 
t o  hi s aud i ence . They knew he was talking t o  t hem , and 
wanting them to understand exa c t l y  what was being sai d . 
There could be no m i �takes i n  understand i ng . 
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Deli very 
A .  What was the n8 ture and qual ity of t h e  speaker ' s  
posture, movement . �estur�. pronunciation . articulat i on ,  
voice qual i t y ,  and use ( pi t c h .  rat e ,  forc e ) ? 
Because the speech i t sel f can �1ve very few hints 
of any type of d·el 1 very the speaker used ,  1. t is necessary 
t o  depend on · observer ' s reaction to t h e  speaker on the 
spec i f i c  occasion and other occasi ons as wel l .  A s  Parri sh 
states i t  i s  oft en very d i f fi cult t o  uncover such i nfor-
ma t i  on . 
There are ,  however, spec i f i c  descri ptions of 
Secretary Connally ' s  delivery . Some compare him to President 
Johnson. 
He strongly resembl es hi s l ong t ime mentor, 
Johnson. There are the same drawl i ng i ntonations 
of speech, the same earthy turns of phras e .  Yet 
hi s features are f i ner and hi s manner smoother 
t han Johnson ' s ;  • • .  He can charm foes with a 
wry, knowing smi l e  that fl i ckers a s  brightly, 
and bri efly as summer l i ghtni ng . 11 1 1  
Behind t h e  T exas charm and folksy manner, he i s  
considered by some to be also harsh and calculating when 
he chooses t o  be . Once whi l e  Governor. Connall y  was i n  a 
panel di scussion on tel evi sion . H e  was d e scri bed a s  having 
" cold eyes and a sulky , self- pityi ng mouth • • .  [ the 
ll " The R i sing Star From Texa s , " Time , October 1 8 ,  
1 9 71 , p .  1 8 .  
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audi ence had] the shatter i ng l m pact of the recogni tion 
t hat � when the Eyes cf T exas Are U po n  You, you are i n  
1 ') seri ous troubl e . " · ·-
Hi s preser.�e � n  the room seems to evoke a stron� 
reacti on . Perhaps 1 t  i s  h i s  apoearance- - he l s  six- foot 
two , blue- eyed , silver-hai red . A c cord l n� to reports even 
h i s  close friends a�ree Connally i s  a vain man concernin� 
h i s  looks . " He bel i eves strongly in appearance-- i n  looking 
the role of a l eader,  i n  looking right for the job and having 
the right set t i ng . " 1 3  
One New York City banker who was watching Connally 
at Muni ch, Germany declared "My G od ,  we have a Treasury 
( 1 4  Secretary w i t h  chari sma . "  Thi s charisma does not , i n  
the case o f  Muni ch , seem t o  stem from charm, but rather 
from talking i n  a very strong .way to the aud i ence,  his  
appearance at  the  conference, and hi s forceful speaking 
t echniques . 
Ro.nn1e Dugger 1 n  the .Atlant i c  descri bed Connall y '  s 
delivery 1 n  formal speeches.  " Talking very qui ckl y ,  l i ke 
a boxer feeding a bat tery of short jabs , he can wind up 
12aobert Sherril l ,  "The R i se of J ohn Connal ly , "  
The Nati on , August 7 ,  1972 ,  p .  72 , 
1 3" John Connally:  Mr .  Nixon ' s  No . 2 Man?" . 
Newsweek , August 9 .  1 971 , p .  1 8 , 
1411 connally ' s  hard Sell Agai nst Inflation , "  Businass 
World , July 10 , 1971 , p .  62 . 
78 
and d el i ver,  a s  though i t  were the sockeroo of the eveni ng ,  
the most reverberat1 n� nul l i ty • ., l 5  
Coming t o  1•· 1 1 � i ch wi th these characteri st i c s ,  he 
was able to evoke the reaction he was hoping for . He knew 
how to use the tools of deli very for the best impact . 
The adaptabi l i ty of Connally may go along with the 
favori t e  parable of hi s ,  di scussed in Chapter Two, that end s 
w1 t h  the punch line " I  can preach it ei ther way . "  · 
A p parently C onr.ally choose to speak without the 
customary nods and winks and told h i s  audi ence what he felt 
had to be said . 
Although the writer did not hear him at Muni c h ,  
G ermany , from s i m i lar speeches , and also others reactions 
menti oned , these·  observations can be madea  he stands 
up very erec t ,  using very few g·estures , perhaps the only 
gesture that comes to mind would be to move hi s hand in a 
hammering manner that emphasizes each important i s sue .  
Hi s pronunciati on and articulation are sharp. The slight 
Texas drawl does not detract from h i s  being understood . 
H i s  pitch i s  a l i t t l e  above normal because of the urgency 
h e  wanted to convey, the rate fa�__s.J._owing only to unde�l ine 
important point s ,  and the force of hrs speaking would have 
been next t o  volat i l e . 
1 5Ronn1e Duge; er,  " J ohn Connallyi Nixon ' s  New 
�Quarterback , "  .Atlant i c ,  Jul y ,  1971 , p .  �3 . 
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Connally' s d el i  very at Munich left the banker·s 
. 
knowing he was a very capable speaker not only i n  formulati ng 
t he content of the sreech , . but also i n  sell i ng i t  t o  the 
men who would be most affected by i t .  
Conclusion 
Thi s chanter was desi gned to present an analysi s 
and evalua t i on of M r .  John B .  Connally ' s  rv:uni ch,  G ermany 
address which he del i vered to the Interna tional Banking 
Conference of the American Bankers A s sociati on on May 2 8 ,  
1 971 .  M r .  Connally' s use of the available means of persuasion 
was examined as far as the content of the speech , the 
speaker ' s  styl i s t i c  dev i ce s ,  and the speaker ' s  deli very . 
Wayland Parri sh' s approach to speech cri ti cism was applied 
to the address in the hope that the wri t er might di scover 
not only how the speech persuaded the l i steners but al so 
t he personal persuasi on Mr . Connally brought to t he speech. 
Conclusions are pinpointed i n  the chapter which follows . 
CHA PTER V 
SU�MAaY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The purpose of the study was to analyze and evaluate 
M r .  J ohn B .  Connelly ' s  speech of �ay 28 , 1971 , wh i c h  was 
deli vered to the I nternational Banking Conference of the 
Ameri can Bankers A s sociat i on i n  Muni ch,  Germany . I n  order 
t o  analyze the s peech properly i t  was imperat i ve to examine 
the speaker ' s  early upbringing and view hi s accompli shments 
J 
as a poli t i cal personali t y  and government spokesman. Special 
considerati on was also gi ven to events leading up to the 
desire by the Uni t ed States to alter the Internati o nal 
Monetary Pol i ci es establi shed at Bretton Woods after world 
War I I ,  i n  the hope that the historical i nformation would 
give t he writer a bet ter perspect i ve for the speech analysi s .  
The criteria by whi ch the speech was analyzed was 
abstracted from Wayland M .  Parri sh ' s  The Study of Speeches , 
Parri sh notes i n  t hi s  arti cle that " t he criti c ' s  concern · 
i s  not wi th the l i teral result of the speech, but wi th the 
speaker ' s  use of a correct methods not with the speech ' s 
effec t , but with i t s  �ffectiveness . "  Parri sh says the cri t i c  
will di scover whether or not the s peake� used the available 
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means of persuasion \ n  the content of the speec h ,  i n  .t h� 
speaker ' s styl e ,  and � n  the speaker ' s  d eli very . 
Thi s  study . t th�refore, fo cuserl on three ba s1 c 
quest i ons raised by �srri sh . They are as followsi 
1 .  What was the r.ature and quaJ i ty of the conte!1t 
o f  the speec!1'i' 
2 .  What was the r:�ture and qual i ty of t.1'1e speaker ' s  
style? 
3 .  What was the nature and qua l i ty of the sneaker• s 
deli very? 
To aid i n  the anal ysi s of t he content of the speech 
t he wri t er asked spec i f i c  questi ons . 
A .  What was the speaker ' s  central thesis? What 
were the i s sues wi th which he dealt? 
B ,  What was the reasoning used? 
C ,  What verbal supports in the speech were used? 
D ,  What motive appeals did the speaker use? 
E. Was the speech organized in general? 
F .  I s  there evidence in the speech that the 
speaker possessed persua sive qual i t i es-­
virtue, intell igenc e ,  and good will? 
When the writer examined Mr. Connally' s speech i n  
light o f  M r .  Parri�h ' s first cri terion , the following d i s-
cover i e s  were made about the content of the speech , 
A n  examination of the l ogi cal proof i nd i cated that 
M r .  Connally had three contenti ons in hi s basic li nes of 
argument . He developed hi s argument by deduct i on ,  supported 
by speci f i c  i nstanc e ,  stat i st i c s ,  explanation ,  testi mony , 
and comparison, The facts and inference seemed appropri ate 
to support hi s cont��tl ons , except that he sometimes us erl 
unsupported opini on s .  The logi cal structure was arranged 
in such a way a s  to he understood by the l i s t eners . 
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The emoti onal proof was constructed to arouse t h e  
emotions o f  t h e  l i s t en e r .  Fair play , fear , and unity w�r� 
the major motive a ppeals used . These a p peal s and blunt n e � s  
o f  t h e  demands caused negative reac t i ons . The curvi 1 1 ne 8 r  
effect caused t h e  emoti onal proof t o  b e  only partially 
effect i v e .  
John Connally possessed a great deal o f  ethical 
appeal before h e  gave t h e  speec h .  He i s  a physically 
attract i ve man , an accompli shed former governor of a state 
i n  Ameri ca , and he came as a representative o f  the financial 
branch of t h e  United States government . Wi thin the speech 
Connally showed a broad knowl edge of the subject matt er , 
a virtue i n  presenting i n format i o n ,  but a problem arose 
i n  t h e  evaluat i on of C onnal ly ' s  expressed good will . Hi s 
strong language and spec i f i c  d emand s t ended to overshadow 
any worthwh i l e  feelings of good wi l l .  
Connally used t h e  t hree-d i vi sion outline o f  i ntro­
duc t i o n , di�cu s s i o n ,  and conclus i o n .  He chose the problem­
solution sequence to pattern hi s d i s cu s s i o n ,  wi th t h e  ex­
plana t i on of each part using t im e  sequence and a special 
topical sequen c e ,  respect i v el y .  The three main d i vi s i ons 
area 1 )  The United Stat e s  has had the full responsibi l ity 
for t h e  econom i c  �rowth of all the count r i e s  in the pa s t ;  
2) The United States can no longer support the I M F  countri e s  
because o f  inner f i nancial problem s ;  and 3) T h e  speci f i c  
areas t o  be changeq a r e  m i l i tary support and t radi ng 
8 J  
arrangements . The or�ani zat1on did proceed 1n a steP-bY­
step manner that aopeared clear and conci s e ,  whi ch hel ped 
i n  the persuasion of  the aud i ence , 
The style chosen by John Connally reflected carefuJ ly 
thought out use of the language . He used several rhetori cal 
devi ces such a s . imagery , personi fi cat ion, repetition ,  
rhetorical questi ons , and parellel structure. He spoke 
i n  both simpl e  and compound sentences with personal reference 
to hi s aud i ence. 
Connally seems to be able to adapt hi s delivery to 
the type of audi ence he i s  addressing .  I n  the case of 
Munich he talked in a very strong way to the aud i ence,  
using forceful speaking t echniques . Hi s physical appearance 
also helped evoke a strong persuasive reacti on--a chari smati c 
effec t .  He left the bankers kn.owing h e  was a very capable 
speaker. 
M r .  Connally ' s persuasive qualities were very 
apparent throughout the speech. The wri ter bel i eves 
Connally did  use the best form of persuasion except i n  the 
use of hi s forceful language .  Connally must have felt the 
audi ence and the urgency of the situation warranted firm talk .  
All i n  �11. M r . Connally was an exciting i nd ividual 
to observe . George Chri stian,  Mr.  Connally ' s former speech 
writer,  summari zes his  l i fe style s  
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He [Connally] i s  a universal man ,  and he feels 
restri cted when he i s  forced to spend all hi s 
t ime on one job . l  
Connally i s  a man who will be i n  the publ i c  view for a 
l ong time to come i f  he chooses to be . 
Conclusions 
The Par�i s h  criteria for speech evaluation was 
applied to thi s speech by John Connally because hi s criteria 
offered a comprehensive approach to speech cri t i ci s m .  
Parr i sh ' s criteria emphasi zed the moderni zation of classi cal 
rhetori c .  
A l though the criteria was useful , it did cause 
problems because the arrangement of the criteria was not in 
a s  workable an order as the writer would have l i ked . A l s o ,  
the speci f i c  words Parrish used i n  some of hi s questions 
needed definition .  Wi th these exceptions the criteria 
could be useful for other cri t i c s  of persuasive speeches . 
A fter completing the speech evaluation and analysi s ,  
. 
the writer would l ik e  to recommend that other speeches by 
John Connally be stud i e d .  Perhaps , si nce M r .  Connally has 
recently shifted from the Democrat i c  to the Republi can 
part y ,  compar i son of h i s  ethical persuasive qual i t i es during 
these two peri ods would be rhetorically benefi cial . 
l " R i s i ng Star, " p .  1 2 .  
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R E�iilRKS C i' .i.'�: s HuNOR.ABLc J C1HN B .  CONN.ALLY 
S ��: :.t:l'AHY OF' 'I'HE T'R i'.:ASUftY 
AT TEE I !Yl ::RNATION.AL .BA N !\J NG CONrc:H ENCE 
OF THE A ;·;ER lCA N BANKEH:� .. �SSOCIA'fTON 
MUN: C :f .  .J ERMA NY , �:it Y 2 8 ,  l 9'?J 
The opportunt ty to part i c 1 rate l n  t!':i s monetary 
conference has been of great value to m e .  I t  i s  a 
privi l eg e ,  and I ' m  �reatly honored by the i nvi tation 
t o  share some of my thoughts wi t h  you at thi s closing 
session.  
The hospitality of our Bavarian hosts is alone 
enough to make i t  worthwhi l e  being her e .  
But w e  are here o n  serious business at a serious 
t ime . We are aware of the strains upon t he monetary 
framework upon which we all depend to carry on our 
i nternati onal commerce . 
Thes e monetary tens i ons are a warning . Elements 
of i nt ernati onal monetary coopera t i on ,  bui l t  wi th so much 
effort i n  the postwar peri od , are being questi oned . 
There are also questions about the di rection of 
our pol i c i e s  i n  the Uni t ed Stat es . I int end to deal 
with these questions openly and frankly, lest doubt s 
corrode our purposes and our succes s .  Most importantl y ,  
we need to recogni z e  that the di sturbances o n  t h e  surface 
of the exchange markets are only symptomat i c  of deeper 
i ssues of national and i nt ernati onal econom i c  pol i c i e s . 
No group i s  more aware t han bankers that our post 
World War I I  prosperi ty has relied on the close int egra­
t i on o f  the world economy and money market s .  We have seen 
nothing l e ss than an economic revolut ion,  with benef i t s · 
widely shared . 
In our exh i l � rat1on over �he gai ns , let us not 
forget that there a�e cost s .  Rapid progress i n  trade 
and investment has meant vast chang es--changes wit h an 
uneven impact . A s  a result , part i cular i ndustri es 
and even entire coun t � i es face d i f fi cult ad justment 
probl ems .  
more 
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By d ef i ni t i on ,  an a l l i ed i nternat i onal economy 
i m pl i es some squeeze on i nd ependent nati onal act i on .  
Bas i c  elements o f  economic and pol i ti cal power , 
and respon s i bi l i t i e s  for leadershi p ,  have drasti cally 
shi fted s i nc e  the mai n  outl i n e s  of postwar pol i cy were 
shaped a generat i on ago . 
W e  must recop:r.1. z e ,  res por.d and adapt to t h e s e  
new real i ti es . 
Int ernal · stabi l i ty and social tranqui l i ty are 
l eg i t i mate goal s of every soc i e t y ,  yours and m i ne . 
But along the road there are temptat i on s .  I t  i s  easy 
t o  und erstand how one country or another can be tempted 
to sh i rk i t s responsibi l i t i es to the international 
communi ty , including the maint enance of monetary ord e r .  
A stable monetary order requires nat ions t o  know and 
a c c e pt t h e  " ru l e s  o f  t he game . "  But let us not confuse 
cause and effect . I t  has been wisely said that money 
i s  but a vei l . Monetary d i s turbances could hel p speed 
the pro c e s s e s  of economic nationa l i s m  and d i s i ntegrat ion . 
But we would be unreal i st i c  t o  ant i c i pate workable 
monetary solutions for essentially non-monetary problems . 
There i s  ·no magic that can reconc i l e  incompat i bl e  
object i ve s .  Money i s  not a subst i tut e for productive 
e f f i c i ency and compet i t ive streng t h . I t  cannot assure 
fair and equitable trading cond i t i ons . The plain danger 
i s  that , by expecting too much from the monetary 
system alone , we may fail t o  address the underlying need 
for change i n  other aspects of our e conomi c  l i f e  and 
pol i c i e s .  
What matters most i s  t he spirit and attitude we 
each bring t o  thi s tas k .  Her e ,  I believe w e  i n  t h e  
Uni t ed States have a special responsibi l i t y  t o  make our 
approach and intentions crystal clear . I hope I do s o .  
Our economy i s  large and ri c h .  W e  have a high 
level o f  trade .  Our markets are relatively open . Our 
currency i s  a world currency .  
Obviously, what w e  do matters a great deal-­
not just to our 200 � � ll i on c i t i zens , but to others 
as well . The manner i n  whi c h  we i n  the Uni t ed States 
more 
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pursue our i nterests i s  crucial t o  any ef fort of the 
world community t o  move ahead together i n  a construct ive , 
cooperat ive way . What can be expected o f  the U . S .  in 
the years ahead? l'llat early patri ot , Patrick Henry , 
once shrewdly observed , " I  know of no way o f  judp.;irig 
the future but by t�'c oast . "  I f  there are those who 
doubt our basi c i ntent i ons and mot i va t i ons , l commend 
t hat standard to you . You will find , I bel i eve , our 
record to be a proud and constructive one , ai med not a t  
dominance but at mutual growth and streng t h .  
Even befpre the end o f  World War II--with the 
cooperation of many , but primarily wi t h  American i ni t ia t i ve 
and support--the foundati ons of the present monetary 
system were set out at Bretton Wood s .  Today , only 
monetary hi storians may recall that t hi s  approach was 
not adopted wit hout a strugg l e .  An important segment of 
American opinion favored the so-called 11 key currency" 
approach . Arguing essentially that the economic asc endancy 
of the United States just i fi ed enshrining a kind o f  
informal dollar-sterling standard wi th other currenci e s  
assuming a more or l e s s  permanent subsidiary rol e .  
But poli cy-makers embraced another l i ne of thought . 
I t  led to the Internati onal Monetary Fund--a t horoughly 
mult i lat eral syst em , with proportional part i c i pation 
and voti ng by all member s .  
The same i s sue was posed--and answered i n  the 
l ong d ebate over the introduction of S pecial Drawing 
Right s .  Again, the Uni t ed States joined enthusiastically 
in a d el i berate decision to seek a broader, multilateral 
base for reserve creat ion,  bui ld i ng on the mechanism 
of the IMF. 
I recogni z e ,  of course, that the monetary system 
establ i shed at Bratton Woods d i d  not abrogat e the reality 
that the u . s .  emerged from World war I I  as the princi pal 
producer of many goods i n  a war- shattered world . Our 
all i e s  and former enemies alike lacked the financial 
resources to buy those goods or rebuild their econom i e s .  
Our · 1nterests and compassion combined t o  provide 
vast resources devoted to reconstructi on through the 
Marshall Plan and oth erwi s e .  New trading arrangements 
were put 1n place ar.d cod i fi ed in the General Agreement 
on Tari ffs and Trad P, .  
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T h e  competi tive rjcovery of other c ountri es w�s 
s peeded by a serious L s i c  of large devaluat1 ons of o t her 
currencies in 1949 ann thereaft er . W e  came to acquiesce 
in res t rictive pra c t i c es by many countri es . , Investments 
by our industry over�'ea c; were strongly encouraESed by our 
tax and other pol i c 1 P s .  And , as the need for financial 
assi stance tapered o f f  i n  Europe , we pi oneered i n  a s s i st&� c �  
t o  the developing world . A t  this po int, theTe was a 
shortage of,  and a c�y for , the U . S .  dollar . 
I recite th� s  bri e f record �ct t o  elicit either 
prai se or t hanks . °'f!!y point is s i m pl e .  W e  have con­
s i stently felt throu�h the years that our basic nati onal 
i nterest l i es in an outward orienta t i o n  of economic 
policy--alert and res ponsive to t h e  needs of others . 
Todays 
--·rhe U . s .  continues as the m a j or c a pital export er :  
--We make heavy outlays for d efense costs i n  
Europe; 
--The aid burden remains larg e ,  d es p i t e  increasing 
parti c i pation by others . 
A s  any nati o n ,  i t  might have been possible for us 
t o  redress our payments balance sharply and decisively 
by tur�i ng _ inward s 
--By heavily protecting our markets ; 
--By sharply cutting our aid ,  and 
--By r et r eating into a " Fortress Ameri ca . "  But 
we refrained . 
our markets have remained among the most open i n  
t h e  world , i n  the fac e  o f  massive increases i n  imports . 
W e  have supported the growth o f  the C o mmon Market, d e s pite 
its commercial and economic costs , We led repeated 
e f forts to cut tariffs multilateral l y ,  while continuing 
to a c c ept the pleas of Japan and the Common Market that 
major areas of their economies should be shielded from 
international compet i t i on .  
I leave i t  to others to judge whether the po l 1 c l c s 
of the United States for more than the past quarter 
century have been benj gn , But I submit they have not 
been pol i c i es of neg l e c t .  · 
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W e  are now d eal l ng wi th not one but two probl ems 
simultaneously in t he i nterest of the monetary system 
and , more broad ly , a l l beral trading ord er .  
I refer firs� t o  our underlyin� d efici t--runnln� 
at $2 to $J billion a year : 
The second r�oblem i s  one of 8norrnous short-t erm 
money flows . I n  a sense,  it grows out o f  t he success 
in achieving broad , fluid , and inte�ra t ed internati onal 
capital and money markets throughout the free world . 
But now we see s1gns that the child of suc c ess i s  
t hreat ening the mother t hat nurtured 1 t-- the system 
of fixed exchange rates and freely convert i bl e  currenc i es . 
Neither of these problems i s  uniquely Ameri can . We 
must all be concerned wi t h  the stabi l i t y  of t he syst em , 
and t he stabi l i t y  of the dollar that l s  a cornerstone of 
the syst em--whether we planned i t  or not and whether we 
l i ke i t  or not . 
The relevant i s sue i s  not t o  f i x  blame for how we 
got where we are--and then engage 1 n  d estruct ive recrimi­
nations. We need a more constructive a pproach .  Let us 
fix national responsi bi l i t i es t o  deal with the problem now 
and i n  the future--responsibi l i t i es that can real i st i cally 
be met because they are well rooted in present ci rcum­
stances and present capabil i t i es--not those of t he first 
Postwar decade . 
Let u s ,  too , i d entify and undertake those joint 
act ions necessary t o  d eal with short-term flows--wi tho�t 
i n  the process t earing apart the e ssential fabri c of the 
system and inst i tutions that serve us all . 
Our own responsibi l i t i e s  are clear enough . The 
largest tradi ng nation and custodian of T.he reserve currency 
1 s  properly asked t o  meet high standards of economic per­
formanc e .  Prosperity and price stabi l i t y  are essential 
ingredients of that performanc e .  
I n  the late 1950 ' s  and early 1 960 • s  we d i d  achieve 
virtual price stabi l i t y .  Our current account reflected 
the benefi t s .  I fully recogni ze that i n  more recent years 
our record has been a l es s  happy one . 
But t he fact j s  that we had the will and the 
courage during t he �ast 2-1/2 years to bring our inflation 
under control by stern fi scal and monet�ry pol i cies . 
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S pec1 f 1 call y ,  we rai sed taxes , and 1 n  1 969 and early 1970 
money was t i ghter and 1 nterest rates hi�her than i n  any 
t i m e  i n  the last 100 y e A r s . 
The domes t i c  �ost has been heavy . �xc e s s  demand 
has g i ven way to eco�o� l c  slack , low pro f i t s ,  and unemploy­
ment of five m i l l i on �eopl e ,  more thar. the ent i r e  labor 
force of the Netherlanj s ,  Belgium or Swi t z erland . 
Inflation has been slow to yi eld--bu t  i t  i s  yield i n[J', .  
Now t i g ht money and f i scal restraint have been replaced by 
ease and s t i mulati o n .  I n  t h e  circumstanc e s ,  i s  thi s wrong? 
I think not . C ertai nly , i t  would make l i t t l e  sense to ask 
for high i nterest rates i n  the U n i ted States at the expense 
of more unemployment , and at the same t i me bl e s s  higher 
rat es of interest abroad becau se other nations beli eve i t  
i s  i n  their interest to u s e  that weapon t o  combat inflation , 
Inflation has contri buted to the prolongation o f  
our balance of payments d efi ci t . But i t  i s  far from the 
only factor. 
S peci f i ca l l y ,  we today spend nearly 9 percent of 
our Gross National Product on defense-- nearly $5 billion 
of that overseas ,  much of i t  in west ern Europe and Japan , 
Financ i ng  a m i l i tary shield i s  a part of the burden of 
leadershi p ;  the responsi bi l i t i e s  cannot and should not be 
cast o f f ,  But 2 5  years after World War I I ,  l eg i t i ma t e  
questions a r i s e  over how t he C O $ t  of t h e s e  r e s pons i b i l i t i e s  
should b e  allocated among t h e  free world alli e s  who benefit 
from that s hi el f .  The nations of western Europe and Japan 
are again strong and vigorou s ,  and their capac i t i e s  to 
contribute have vastly increased . 
I find i t  an i m pressive fac t ,  and a depressing fact , 
t hat the pers i s t ent und erlying balance of payments d e f i c i t  
whi c h  causes such concern, i s  more than covered , year i n  
and year out ,  by our net m i l i tary expenditures abroad , over 
and above amount s recei ved from foreign m i l i tary purcha ses 
i n  the u . s .  
A second area where action i s  plainly overdue l i es 
1 n  trading arrangement s .  The comfortable assumption that 
t h e  United States should - - i n  the broader pol i t i cal intere s t s  
o f  the free world--be w i l l i ng t o  bear d i s proporti onate 
economi c  costs does not f i t  the facts of today. I do not 
for a moment call i n t o  question the worth of a self- conf i d e r:t 
cohesive, Common Mark � t .  a s t rong Japan, and a progre ssi ng ,  
Canada , to the peace and prosperity of the free world 
communi t y .  
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rhe ques t i on \ s  only- - bu t  the only 1 s  i m portant-­
whether those na t i or. s , now more than amply su pp) i ed wi t h  
r e s erves a s  well a �  w t t h produ c t i ve power, should not n o w  
be called u pon for f �e � h  i n i t i a t i ve ln o p e n i ng t h e i r  
markets to t h e  prod1:,� �. s o f. othe rs . 
I s  i t  natura1 or i n evi table that f u l l y  30 perc�nt 
of J apan e s e  exports ro to the U .  s .  mark e t - - o r  d o  r e � tri r, r. j on s  
i n  Europe h e l p  a c cou�t f o r  t h e  d i recti on of that fl ow? 
A ft e r  years of i ncome gro�th av3rae1ng more t han t � n  
percent , should ·not t h e  J a pa n e s e  c onsumer have f r e e  a c c e s s  
t o  t h e  prod u c t s  o f  t h e  out s i d e  worl d ?  
Must Canada m a i n t a i n  tar i f f s  o n  ori va t e  purcha s e s  
o f  U .  s .  autos a t  a t i m e  when a bal a n e e  o f  payme n t s  surplus 
has resul t ed i n  a " fl o a t i ng" exchange rate? 
I s  it right that U n i ted S t a t e s  agricul tural prod u c t s  
f i nd a c c e s s  t o  t h e  d en s e l y  popula t ed conti nent o f  Europe 
i ncreasingly l i m i ted? 
I would sugg e s t  that all o f  t h e s e , and m o r e ,  are 
proper matters for nego t i a t i on and resoluti on among us on 
a more equ i ta bl e  ba s i s .  
On the s i d e  o f  f i nancial pol i c y ,  I t h i nk we have 
a l l  become more aware o f  t h e  l i m i ta t i ons placed on coordi­
nated a c t i o n  by dome s t i c  pol i cy requi rement s .  R e peated 
reference has been made in thi s conference to the d i f f i ­
cult i e s- - w i t h  t h e  best w i l l  i n  the worl d - - o f  synchroni z i ng 
i nt ernati onal monetary and f i scal pol i ci e s .  The hard fa c t  
i s  tha t t h e  bus i n e s s  cycl e i s  not uni form from country to 
country- - i nd eed , i t  is perhaps fortunate t ha t  it i s  not . 
I n  t h e s e  c i rcumstances i t  i s  s t i l l  a dream--a 
worthy dream t o  be sure , but no more than that--to a c hi eve a 
common level of i nt er e s t  rat e s .  There are large d i s pa r i t i e s  
today--there have been before--and there w i l l  b e  aga i n .  
I f  we are not a l l  to take refuge beh i nd a sh i el f  o f  com­
prehensive exchange controls or s pl i t  exchange rat e s , money 
w i l l  move from nati on to nat i o n ,  and o f t � n  i n  larger volu�e 
and f a s t er than we would l ike to s e e .  
Here i s  a c l e B r  and present dan�er t o  our monetsry 
s y s t em . We must re��nc i l e  the stab1 l i ty needed to f a c i l i � � t P 
trade and i nvestment w i t h  the f l ex i bi l i t y needed to c o pe 
w i t h  m a s s i ve flows of fund s ,  actual and potent i al . 
more · 
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I am conv1 n � e i  the sol u t 1 0 n  cannot be one- d i m� n s l o n R l . 
And I wi l l  not now q t t em ot t o  s e t  forth a fi ni shed }:il u e­
print for a compreh e n ·; l ve a pproach . 
But two 1 i •· �� � o r  at tack �eP.r.1 t o  rrr� bot h  prom 1 s.� nv. 
and pot ent i a l l y  pra <' t  � c:R l .  I n  com b� r:t:t t i on , t: hey could v;o 
a l ong way . 
Fl e x i bi l i t y  l s  e s s enti al . T'hi s r e q u i res a c e r tA l r• 
ela s t i c i t y  i n  f i na nc � n� .  Much has �een � �r e  already 
on an ad hoc basi s .  
I n  the preser.t s i tua t i on �he u .  S .  ha s mad e c l e a r  
i t s  wi l l i ng n e s s  to hel o by absorbln� s o m e  fu�d s from t h e  
Euro-dollar market or e l s ewhe r e ,  r e c y cl i ng t h e s e  funds t o  
t h e  U .  S .  before t hey reach o f fi c i al hand s abroad . ·rhe 
recent short-t erm borrowi ngs of � 3  bi l l i o n  by t h e  Treasury 
and the Export- I m port Bank are a c a s e  i n  ooi nt . In spec i f i c  
i n stanc e s , addi t i onal dollar i nvestment ou t l e t s  tai l ored 
t o  t h e  need s of central banks m i g h t  have a useful subsi d i a ry 
rol e .  A t  t h e  same t i m e ,  we have a ri�ht to anti ci oa t e  
t ha t  other central banks w i l l  n o t  t hemselves add to t h e  
market supply of d ol lars by cont r i bu t i ng to t h e  mult i pl l ca t i on 
o f  Eurodollars . 
Further explora t i o n  o f  t h e se matters need s ,  and i s  
r e c e i vi ng ,  urgent attent i o n .  Moreover , i n  t h e  i nt erest o f  
both equi t y  and f i na nc i al ord e r ,  we must a s k  ourselves 
whether the Eurodollar market should be accorded a 
po s i t i on free of supervi s i on and regulat i o n  whi ch w e  deny 
to our domest i c  banking s y s t em s .  
Second l y ,  i n  t h e  l i ght o f  recent pressures ,  the 
ques t i on of cod i fy i ng a d egree of a d d i tional flexi bi l i ty 
wi t h  regard. t o  exchan�e rate pract i c e s  i s  clearly 
relevant . De facto events have brought some elements o f  
fl exi bil i t y .  But I doubt that any o f  u s  could be sat i sf i ed 
w i t h  t h e  variety o f  r e s ponses t o  t he � m pera t i v e s  o f  
speculative pressure s .  
The d a nger i s  Pla i n .  To revert t o  t h e  u s e  o f  
exchange rat e s  a s  a supplementary tool o f  dome s t i c  pol i cy 
i s  fraught w i t h  dan�er t o  t h e  e s s en t i a l  stabi l i ty and 
su s t a i na bi l i t y  of th� syst em as a whol e .  
A s  t i m e  and � v �n t s  chang e ,  w e  must: re spond w i t h  a 
recogni t i on o f  mutueJ needs and conf j d en c e .  W e  all 
recogni z e  there i s  no �ore room for monetary or 
econom i c  i solati o n .  
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I t  i s  t o  0ur mutual i nterest t o  work out the �orl � ' s  
monetary probl ems so that trade and commerce may 
e x pand and thus s u n �·.yrt national neec1s , 
Hel pful t o  r : � e  solu t i on of any pro blem l s  the 
und erstand1 ng that t. !-1 ere are necessa ri 1 y sor.ie 
unalt erable posi t i ons of any part i c i pant . bel i eving 
t hi s ,  I want wi thout arrogance or d e fiance to make i t  
abundantly clear that. s the Nixon A d m i n i s t ra t i o n  l s  
dedi cat ed to assuri r.g the i n t egri t y ,  and mai �tai ni ng t � e  
strength o f  the dol l u r .  
W e  are not � o i ng t o  devalu e .  
W e  are not going to change t h e  pri c e  of gold . 
We are control l i ng our inflation . w e  also are 
st i mulat in� econom i c  growth at a oace which wi l l  not 
beg i n  new inflation . 
So far as other nat ions are concerned: We fully 
recognize you are not wi l l i ng to l i ve with a . system 
d i ctat ed by the Uni ted Stat e s .  
But ,  a s  you share i n  the system, we have the right 
to expect more equitable t rading arrangement s .  
W e  also expect you to accept the responsibi l i ty 
t o  share more fully i n  the cost of d efending the free world . 
Fi nallys  
No longer does the U .  s .  economy dom i nate the free 
world . No longer can considerations of fri endshi p ,  
or need , o� capacity justi fy the Uni t ed States carrying 
so heavy a share of the common burd en s . 
, And , t o  be perfectly frank , no longer will the 
A merican people perm i t  their government to engage 1 n  
i nt ernat i onal acti ons 1 n  which the true long-run i nterests 
of the u .  s .  are not just a s  clearly recognized as those · 
of t he nations wi t h  wh1 ch we d eal . 
And i t  i s  wi � n  t hi s  understandln� that I say t o  
you that i ncreased coooeration among u s  a l l  must play a 
key role i n  maintain� �� a stable monetary system . 
You can be a s �ured that we will. do our part . 
oOo 
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.A PPENDIX B 
Mr . John B .  Connally 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Washington D . C .  
Dear M r .  Connally,  
M s .  fiita Colbert 
Trailer 14--H . H .  l 
CharJ. e s t o n ,  Illi n O l R 
I am a graduate student i n  Speech at �ast ern Illinois Uni versity 
and have decided to write my Master• s 'l'hesi s on an aspect 
of your publ i c  speaking career , Therefore, I am interested 
i n  knowing i f  I might obtain as many of your speeches you 
have delivered a s  possi bl e ,  
I n  order t o  complete my study i t  i s  imparative that I obta1 n  
a s  many a s  are available so that I may acquire an accurate 
random sampl i ng .  I understand you wi l l  not have them all , 
but I would appreciate you either sending me a s  many a s  you 
can or advi sing m e  a s  to where else I might obtain them . 
A s  one part of the thesi s requires that I write a biographical 
sketch of you as a speaker, it i s  necessary for me to re­
search your past speech training and also i t  would benefit 
me to know what your phi losophy of publ i c  speaking i s .  I f  
there i s  any information you could send m e  a s  t o  the matters 
ment i o ned I would be most interest ed in them as well . 
Thank you for any help you can g i ve m e .  
S i ncerel y ,  
R i t a  Colbert 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF T H C  TREASURY 
\N,\SH I N G l  C>N. D.C 20220 
October 1 2 , 1 � 7 1  
Dear Miss Colbert : 
Enclosed are copies o f  Secretary Connally ' s  
speeches , test imony and transcripts of other public 
appearances he has made s ince taking office as 
S e cretary of the Treasury . 
Also enclosed is a biography of the Secretary . 
For other speeches , I would suggest you contact 
the Department of the Navy and the Go�ernor ' s  office 
in Texas . 
We have not yet ascertained whether the Secretary 
had any formal speech training , but have been in 
contact with the University of Texas and expect t o  
hear from them soon . 
Our Deputy Special Ass istant says that if you 
listen to a recording of one o f  the Secretary ' s  speeches , 
you will note that he pauses in the middle o f  a sentence 
and begins the next sentence almost immediate ly .  
I n  this way , the listener is forced to pay attention 
in order to keep up with his train of thought . The 
Secretary usually s ums up at the beginning and makes 
h i s  main point then , . rather than waiting until the 
end of the speech. 
We will be in touch with you again once we hear 
from the University of Texas . 
Miss Rita Colbert 
Trailer No . 14 
R. R. 1 
Charleston , Illinois 
Enclosures - ,a-h.t. . .  t-/ 
Sincerely yours , 
Miss E i leen Cooper 
Off ice of Public Affairs 
, 
\ )_/ �<A· \...· • [. -
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B I OGRAPHY 
JOHN BOWDEN CONNALLY JR . 
John Bowden Conn a l l y  J r .  was sworn i n  as S e c r e t a ry 
o f  the T r e a s u ry February 1 1 ,  1 9 7 1 . 
He j o i n e d  T r e a s u ry w i t h  a backg round in l e g a l , b u s i ne s s , 
corpo r a t e  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  affa i r s ; s e rv i ce as S e c r e t a ry o f  
t h e  Navy ; t h r e e  t e rms a s  t h e  Governor o f  Texas , and a d i s ­
t in g u i s h e d  w a r  recnrd i n  the Navy . 
At t h e  t i me o f  h i s  appointment , he was a · s e n i o r  p a r t n e r  
o f  t h e  l aw f i rm o f  V in s on , E lk i n s , Sear l s  & Conn a l l y  i n  
Houston , . Texas . 
Born February 2 7 , 1 9 1 7 , i n  F l o r e s v i l l e ,  Texas , he i s  
the son o f  John Bowden Conn a l l y  and L e l a  W r i gh t  Conn a l l y  
o f  F l o re s v i l l e .  He a t tended pub l i c  ..... s c ho o l s  i n  F l o r e sv i l le 
and H a r l a n d a l e  (San Ant o n i o ) .  He was g r a d u a t e d  from the 
U n i v e r s i ty of Texa� i n  Aus t i n  w i t h  the d e g r e e  of Bache l o r  
o f  Laws . 
-
Mr . Connally ' s  f i r s t  a s s i gnment in W a s h i n g t o n  was as 
s e c r e t a r y  t o  U .  S .  Rep r e s e n t a t i ve Lyndon B .  Johnson o f  
Texas , i n  1 9 3 9 , b u t  he r e s i gn e d  t o  e n t e r  the Navy i n  . ,  
February 1 9 4 1 .  Comm i s s i on e d  ens ign , he r o s e  by O c t o b e r  1 9 4 5  
t o  l ie u t enant commande r ,  a rank he he l d  un t i l  l e aving the 
N a v a l  R e s e rve . 
He s e r v e d  i n  the O f f i ce o f  the C h i e f  o f  Naval 
Ope ra t i ons and the O f f i ce o f  the Unde r S e c r e t ary o f  the 
Navy . r l n  February 1 9 4 3 , he was t r an s fe rr e d  to N o r t h  Afr i c a , 
where he h e l p e d  t o  p l an the I t a l i an inva s i ons at h i s  p o s t  
i n  A l g i e rs . 
L a t e r  he s e rv e d  in the P a c i f i c  ab oard the a i r c r a f t  
c a r r i e r s  E s s e x  a n d  Bennington . The E s s e x  won the P re s i dent i a l  
U n i t  C i t a t i o n . 
He was d e c o r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  Bronze S t a r  M e d a l  w i t h  
Combat "V" and h e  w a s  l a t e r  d e c o r a t e d  w i t h  the L e g ion o f  
Me r i t  w i t h  Combat "V" . 
S e p a r a t e d  from n a v a l  s e r v i c e  i n  January 1 9 4 6 , he h e l p e d  
t o  o r g an � z e  rad i o  s t a t i on KVET i n  Aus t i n , Tex as , wh i c h  he 
s e rved as A t t orney , Pre s i d e n t  and Gene r a l  Manag e r ,  1 9 4 6 - 4 9 .  
He was admin i s t r a t ive as s i s t an t  t o  Sen a t o r  Lyndon B .  
Johnson i n  1 9 4 9 , and a member of the l a w  f i rm o f  Powe l l , 
W i r t z  and Rahau t , in Aus t i n ,  1 9 4 9 - 5 2 .  From 1 9 5 2  t o  1 9 6 1  
he was a t t o rney for S i d  W .  R i c h a r d s on and Perry R .  B as s , 
i n  Fort Worth , ac t i ve i n  the management o f  broadc a s t i n g , 
r e a l  e s t a t e , r e t a i l  s a l e s , o i l  and g a s , ranch i n g , man u f a c ­
t u r i n g  a n d  i n v e s tment i n t e re s t s . I n  1 9 5 9 , he succeeded 
M r .  R i ch a r d s on on t h e  b o a r d  of the New York C e n t r a l  Rai l ro a d . 
Pres i d e n t  John F .  Kennedy d e s i g n a t e d  M r .  Conn a l l y 
S e c r e t ary o f  t h e  Navy on D e c e mb e r  2 7 , 1 9 6 0 , and he took 
the o a t h  o f  o f f i c e  January 2 5 , 1 9 6 1 . Mr . Conn a l l y  r e s i gne d ,  
e ff e c t ive Decemb e r  2 0 , t o  run for Governor o f  Texas . 
Governor Conna l ly took o f f i c e  i n  Janu a r y  1 9 6 3  t o  
b e g i n  a s ix - ye a r  s t ay i n  Aus t i n .  I n  1 9 6 4  i n  w i n n i n g  renom i n a ­
t i o n  f o r  a s e c o n d  t e rm , h e  b e came the f i r s t  Texan t o  r e ce i ve 
more than one m i l l i on v o t e s  i n  a p r imary e l e c t i o n . 
On November 2 2 ,  l g 6 3 ,  Governor Conn a l l y  was c r i t i c a l ly 
wounded wh i le r i d i n g  w i t h  John F .  Kennedy when the P re s i de n t  
was a s s a s s i n a t e d  a t  D a l l as , Te�as . 
He was e l e c t e d  Chai rman o f  the Caucus o f  Demo c r at i c  
Governo r s , June 1 9 6 4 ; C h a i rman o f  the Southern Governo r s ' 
Confe rence , 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 ; and C h a i rman o f  the I n t e r s t a t e  O i l  
Compact Comm i s s ion in 1 9 6 5 .  He w a s  v i c e · c h a i rman o f  ·re x as ' 
d e l e g a t i o n s  t o  the Demo c r a t i c  Nat i on a l  Conven t i o n s  i n  1 9 5 6  
and 1 9 6 0 , and de l e g at i on cha i rman i n  1 96 4  and 1 9 6 8 . 
Be fore h i s  nomi n a t i on as S e c r e t ary o f  the T r e a s ury , 
M r .  Conn a l ly was a d i re c t o r  o f :  F i r s t  C i ty N a t i on a l  Bank , 
Hous t on ; Texas I n s t ruments I n corporat e d , D a l l as ; H a l l i b u r t on 
Company , Duncan , O k l ahoma ; Gen e r a l  Port l an d  Cement Company , 
D al l as ;  G ib r a l t a r  S a v i n g s  A s s o c i a t i o n , Hous t on ; M i d - Texas 
Commun i c a t i o n s  Systems I n c o rporat e d , K i l l e e n , Texas ; H o u s t on 
Chamb e r  o f  Comme rce ; l louston L iv e s tock Show and Rode o ; Fort 
Worth F a t  Stock Show an d Expo s i t i on ; l lou s t on Me d i c a l  
Foundat i o n ; Texas Rese arch League ; South Texas Chamb e r  o f  
Comme rce ; Texas Heart I n s t i tu t e ; and Hou s t on Symphony Soc i e t y . 
He a l s o  was a t r u s t e e  o f  the Uni ted S t a t e s  T r u s t  Company , 
New York , New York , a Comm i s s i o n e r  Gene r a l  o f  the 1 9 6 8  
San Anton i o  Wor l d ' s  F a i r , and founder o f  the Academy o f  
Texas , 1 9 6 8 .  
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M r .  Connal l y s e rved on P r e s i de n t  N i xon ' s  Adv i s o ri 
C o un c i l  on E x ecu�ive O r g an i z at i on , 1 9 6 9 - 7 0 , w a s  app o i n t e d  
by t h e  Pre s i dent a s  a memb e r  o f  the Fore i g n  I n te l l i g e n c e  
Adv i s o ry B o ar d , 1 9 7 0 . l i e  i s  a member o f  t h e  H o u s t on , t h e  
Texas a n d  the Ame r i c a n  B a r · �s s o c i a t i on s . 
He and the forme r M i s s  I dane l l  Br i l l  o f  Aus t i n  were 
mar r i e d  on D e c em b e r  2 1 , 1 9 4 0 .  They have three c h i l d ren : 
John B .  Conna l l y  I I I , 2 4 , a se cond - ye a r  l aw s t udent at 
the U n i ve r s i ty of T e x a s ; Mark Conna l l y ,  1 8 ,  a f r e s hman 
at the U n i ve r s i ty of T e x a s ; and Mrs . Rob e r t  ( Sharon) Ammann , 
wh o l i v e s  i n  Rams t e i n , Ge rmany , w i t h  he r h u s b and and two 
d a u gh t e r s . 
February 1 7 ,  1 9 7 1  
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